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ERROR OF QUALITY IN 
RECENT ROTAL JURISPRUDENCE* 
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S U M M A R Y . I. I N T R O D U C T I O N . A Q U A L I T Y D I R E C T L Y A N D P R I N C I P A L L Y I N T E N D E D 
A N D A N O B J E C T I V E L Y I M P O R T A N T Q U A L I T Y . A . Sentences which use a combination 
of Canals' interpretation and St. Alphonsus' third rule to recognize «error redundans» 
B . Changes in the concept of matrimony which have influenced the notion of«error re-
dundans». C . A Brief History of St. Alphonsus' Third Rule in older Rotal Ju-
risprudence. D . A quality principally and directly intended. E. Proving a quality 
principally and directly intended. I I . A D D I T I O N A L Q U E S T I O N S C O N C E R N I N G C A N O N 
1097 § 2 ( « E R R O R R E D U N D A N S » , « E R R O R C A U S A M D A N S » A N D R E T R O A C T I V I T Y ) . 
A. Error «Causam Dans» and an error of quality directly and principally intended. 
B . 77ie- retroactivity of canon 1097 §2. C O N C L U S I O N S . J U R I S P R U D E N C E . 
B I B L I O G R A P H Y . T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S O F T H E D O C T O R A L T H E S I S . 
I. INTRODUCTION. A QUALITY DIRECTLY AND PRINCIPALLY 
INTENDED AND AN OBJECTIVELY IMPORTANT QUALITY 
The new Code of Canon Law, promulgated in 1983, has changed its 
disposition concerning an error of quality of the person capable of invali-
dating matrimony. As one may read in the acts concerning the drafting of 
canon 1097 § 2 (CIC 1983), this new formula corresponds *to St. 
Alphonsus' doctrine and present-day Rotal jurisprudence 1. Even before 
the new code was being elaborated, Rotal jurisprudence has often strug-
* Director de la tesis: Prof. Dr. Juan Ignacio BANARES. Titulo: Rotal Jurisprudence 
concerning Error of quality. Fecha de defensa: 17.12.1991. 
1. Cfr. Communicationes, 1983, p. 232. 
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gled with the problem of discerning when an error of quality affects the 
validity of the matrimonial contract. 
Judge Canals, in a famous decision handed down on April 21 , 1970, 
proposed a distinct formula for error redundans, that is, when an error of 
quality redounds in error of the person: «when a moral, juridical or social 
quality is considered so intimately connected with the physical person 
that, if this same quality is lacking, then the physical person turns out to 
be altogether different*2. Hence, with this definition of the person, one 
must take into account qualities which are able to substantially change the 
person. 
Although Canals' interpretation met with some resistence, it did have 
a strong influence on subsequent jurisprudence. In particular, one concept 
did stick: that the quality must be objectively important. At the same time, 
the third Alphonsian rule began gaining a wider acceptance and forming 
its own current. In many decisions, the aforementioned aspect continued 
being used in conjunction with an error of quality as interpreted by St. 
Alphonsus' third rule 3. In other words, in order to recognize that an error 
of quality redounds in error of the person two new requirements were 
elaborated: 1) The quality must be important from an objective point of 
view, and 2) the same quality must be principally and directly intended by 
the contractant (St. Alphonsus' third rule). 
Nearly all of the sentences which followed this line of thought, de-
spite the fact that they required these two aspects to declare the nullity of 
the marriage, put more weight on the subjective aspect than on the objec-
tive aspect. Thus, the subjective importance of the quality received a pri-
2. «Tertia notio est cum qualitas moralis iuridica socialis tam intime connexa habetur 
cum persona physica ut, eadem qualitate deficiente, etiam persona physica prorsus diversa 
resultet». Coram (c.) CANALS, April 21, 1970, n. 2 in SRRD , Vol. 62, pp. 370 ff. Future 
references to Rotal sentences which are published in SRRD will give only the date and the 
ponens. All other decisions will be fully referenced. 
3. One author has expressed a different opinion about St. Alphonsus' third rule which 
does not seem to have prospered. «Pienso que la 'tertia regula' alfonsiana, tal como ha sido 
reelaborada por Giacchi y Fumagalli, solamente tiene viabilidad jurídica dentro de la 'tertia 
notio' desarrollada por la sentencia coram Canals, de 21 de abril de 1970...» M. LÓPEZ 
ALARCÓN, El «error qualitatis personae» en el consentimiento matrimonial según el nuevo 
Código de Derecho Canónico, Murcia 1983, p. 26. For another study by the same author, 
one may consult El error de cualidad en el consentimiento matrimonial, in «XVHI Semana 
española de Derecho Canónico», Salamanca 1984, pp. 293-303. 
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ority -not only of consideration but also of degree- over the objective im-
portance. 
A. Sentences which use a combination of Canals' interpretation and St. 
Alphonsus' third rule to recognize «error redundans» 
The decision given by Di Felice on March 26, 1977 seems to be the 
first sentence which clearly demands this double aspect. The cause was 
seen by five auditors, and the verdict was pro nullitate on the grounds of 
error of a quality which redounded in error of the person. The decision's 
in iure is a mixture of Canals' interpretation and St. Alphonsus' third 
rule. Although this combination of the two figures is taken up by later ju-
risprudence, its elaboration as presented in this cause is more extensive 
and better explained. For this reason, it may be useful to dwell a bit more 
on this sentence. 
The facts of the cause concern the matrimony of Charles and Mary 
which took place on February 2, 1961. From the start, the matrimony 
was not very happy; even after the birth of a daughter things did not 
change. Charles, in general, thought little about his wife. When she 
became ill, he encouraged his wife to return to her mother, which she did 
in 1964. After March 19, 1966, he was never heard from again. 
Mary received a legal separation in March of 1967, and after having 
found out that Charles was not a doctor (as she believed him to be), Mary 
started the process of nullity on July 27, 1970. The cause was first 
presented on the grounds of condition; later that of error was added. On 
May 22, 1972 the nullity was granted for error, but not for condition. 
Thus the cause was appealed by the Defender of the Bond and arrived to 
the Roman Rota 4. 
In the in iure part of the cause, the auditors quote canon 1083 § 2 of 
the 1917 code. They go on to discuss the various explanations of error 
redundans beginning with the strict interpretation as set forth by Sanchez 
and continue with St. Alphonsus' third rule 5 . The decision spends more 
4. Cfr. c. Di FELICE, March 26, 1977, n. 1. 
5. The text of the rule is badly cited in n. 3 of this sentence. 
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time speaking about St. Alphonsus' rule and pointing out some jurispru-
dence which has accepted this opinion 6. 
Afterwards, the sentence mentions Canals' interpretation citing the 
well-known affirmation that a person can be considered totally different 
based on the social, juridical or moral aspects of the individual. The tur-
nus goes on to discuss those qualities which are extremely important in 
determining the person: qualities such as social condition, patrimony, 
family condition, and the status of the person. These qualities, in them-
selves or in the society in which one lives, are so esteemed as to be able to 
define specific persons 7. 
However, immediately after this assertion concerning the importance 
of these qualities, the sentence states: «one cannot forget that we are in the 
area of error, and therefore, we must give greatest importance to the will 
of the contractant, that is, to the value and importance which the contrac-
tant attributes to the determining quality which individualizes the person 
whom the contractant wishes to marry» 8. 
What this decision presents, then, is a double aspect from which the 
error of quality must be considered. One is the objective aspect which 
considers the quality as esteemed by society or by the general opinion of 
men. The other aspect is that of the contracting party, or better yet, the 
will of the contracting party; the task is to measure the importance of the 
quality as conceived in the mind of the one who erred and in the «mind» 
of the society or culture in general. In other words, is the quality socially 
or objectively important, and was this quality principally and directly in-
tended by the contractant at the moment of giving consent? 
6. Di Felice cites the decisions c. MANNUCCI, June 20, 1932 and c. Heard, June 21, 
1 9 4 1 . 
7. Cfr. c. Di FELICE, March 26, 1977, n. 4. 
Another paragraph of the sentence states: «Persona ideo cum sit 'quoad omnes suas 
dotes' a Concilio considerata, atque cum personae coniugum, ita descriptae, pro intima 
eorum coniunctione foedere coniugali tradi debeant, error qualitatis, etiam non individualis 
et unius sed communis aliis personis, dummodo personam peculiari ratione determinantis, 
qui error sit dans causam contractui, redundare potest 'in errorem personae' iuxta can. 1083, 
§ 2, n. 1, ideoque matrimonium irritare potest», c. Di FELICE, March 26, 1977, n. 5, in fine. 
The issue of error causam dans is addressed later in this study. 
8. «Neque oblivioni dari potest, nos versari in provincia erroris, ideoque perquam-
maxime attendere debemus ad mentem contrahentis, idest ad valorem et momentum quod ipsa 
tribuit determinatae qualitati pro individuanda ilia persona, quacum contrahere voluit», c. Di 
FELICE, March 26, 1977, n. 4 in fine. 
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These ideas are not innovative, but the combination is new. The 
Alphonsian rule had been invoked in previous sentences, and one of these 
decisions grants the nullity based on this concept alone 9. Others consider 
it a solid solution but do not apply it. Judge Pinto considered it as one of 
three elements necessary for error redundans10. 
Now again, the third rule becomes a requisite in order to have an er-
ror of quality which redounds in an error of the person. The difference is 
that the previous elements (which required that the spouses be unknown 
and that the quality only identify one specific person) have been replaced 
by the wider interpretation of the person according to the Canalian expla-
nation. Though the sentence is not so explicit as to number the rules (and 
dividing them so clearly), it is evident that this is the reasoning it follows. 
This double aspect concerning error redundans becomes even more ap-
parent when the law is applied to the facts of the cause. The auditors make 
it a point to prove that «the error of quality concerning the medical pro-
fession of the respondent...truly redounds in error of the person, be it for 
objective reasons be it for subjective reasons* 1 1 . 
The sentence then presents evidence to prove these two aspects were 
present. As for the argument that the quality of being a doctor is objec-
tively important, the decision states: being a false doctor is different from 
being a doctor. Therefore, an error concerning the medical profession of a 
person is an error which redounds in the person himself, since a false 
doctor is completely different from a real one 1 2 . Earlier in the sentence, 
the judges point out the importance and great esteem which the medical 
profession enjoys; doctors are considered to have an excellent juridical 
and social status in our day. For this reason, the judges conclude that 
feigning a medical diploma would certainly have grave consequences in 
family l i fe 1 3 . Later in the cause, just before declaring the nullity on ac-
count of error, the sentence once again emphasizes the fact that the quality 
9. Cfr. c. HEARD, June 21, 1941. 
10. Cfr. c. PINTO, November 12, 1973, n. 11. 
11. «Error qualitatis de arte medica conventi ... vere est redundans in errorem personae 
rationibus sive obiectivis sive subiectivis», c. Dl FELICE, March 26, 1977, n. 10. 
12. «Obiective igitur alia est persona medici, alia persona falsi medici; ideoque error 
qualitatis quoad artem medicam alicuius personae est error redundans in personam, quia 
persona falsi medici est prorsus diversa», c. Dl FELICE, March 26, 1977, n. 10. 
13. Cfr. c. Dl FELICE, March 26, 1977, n. 10. 
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about which Mary erred is of great importance (maximi momenti) in pre-
sent t imes 1 4 . 
Pausing here for a moment, some observations can be made concern-
ing this requisite. In short, how does one objectively define an important 
quality? When can one maintain without doubt that a particular quality is 
so highly esteemed in society that it makes the person totally different? 
In this decision, it is maintained that the quality of being a doctor is 
extremely important, not only from the point of view of society, but also 
from the point of view of how it could affect family life. No doubt, this is 
true. However, upon studying this particular cause, the evidence seems to 
contradict this reasoning. That is to say, the reality that Charles was not a 
doctor, had no real impact upon the matrimony. The matrimony got off to 
a bad start and continued getting worse; but there was no cause and effect 
relation between the quality lacking and a poor matrimonial life. Mary 
lived with her husband for three years thinking he was a doctor, and 
when they separated, she still believed him to be a doctor. 
Even in 1967, when Mary asked to receive a civil divorce, she con-
tinued thinking that Charles was a doctor, and this fact was recorded as 
such in the proceedings of the Civil Court 1 5 . As is evident, the matrimony 
did not break down (at least not primarily) because Charles lacked the de-
sired quality. 
Taking these facts into account, it would seem that the quality which 
was to be of such great importance in the eyes of society and in the gen-
eral esteem of men, turned out to have relatively little influence -in fact- in 
matrimonial life. 
In other words, from an objective point of view, it was completely 
indifferent that Charles was thought to be a doctor when he really was not 
one. The relationship between Mary and Charles did not suffer because of 
this error; there were no grave difficulties (objectively speaking) which 
resulted because of this inaccuracy. It would seem, then, that the rule of 
the objective importance of the quality is disproved. Or, at the very least, 
it seems to run into contradictory results. 
1 4 . Cfr. c. Di FELICE, March 2 6 , 1 9 7 7 , n. 1 1 . 
1 5 . Cfr. c. Di FELICE, March 2 6 , 1 9 7 7 , n. 9 . 
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The second aspect concerns the subjective esteem given to the quality 
by the contfactant. Mary had asked for, and received, a civil separation in 
1967, still believing Charles to be a doctor, but it was not until she real-
ized her mistake, and it was precisely at this moment, when she pursued 
the Ecclesiastical nullity 1 6 . This manner of acting would seem to clearly 
indicate the will or intention she had in marrying. The plaintiff did not 
really consider the marriage null -at least in front of the Church- until she 
found out the truth about her husband not being a doctor. Therefore, the 
decisive moment occurs in the area of the subjective aspect of the error; 
that is, when the contractant realizes the mistake. Her intention was to 
marry a doctor 1 7 , and upon discovering that her husband was not a doc-
tor, she considers the matrimony null and begins the nullity process. 
Given these facts, it is evident that the subjective aspect had a much 
more profound effect on the matrimonial bond, not only from the subjec-
tive point of view of the wife, but moreover from the objective aspect of 
the matrimonial consent. In other words, the deeds would indicate that 
Mary not only wanted to marry a doctor, but she actually bound her mat-
rimonial consent to marrying a person with this quality. The judges spend 
a good deal of time on this issue, and they give abundant evidence which 
supports this affirmation 1 8. 
The «double-requirement» interpretation of error redundans also ap-
pears in other decisions by the Roman Rota; here, a quick mention is 
made of those sentences which promote this interpretation with a brief 
commentary where appropriate. 
It is not surprising to encounter another decision by Di Felice which 
encourages the same interpretation or reading of error redundans. In fact, 
in a sentence of January 14, 1978, the auditor specifically mentions the 
1 6 . «Cum vero mulier sciverit Carolum Edmundum non esse medicum, libello diei 2 7 
iulii 1 9 7 0 nullitatis matrimonium accusavit...», c. Di FELICE, March 2 6 , 1 9 7 7 , n. 1. 
1 7 . «Iterum mentem suam pandit: 'Era mia volontà precisa sposare un medico'», c. Di 
FELICE, March 2 6 , 1 9 7 7 , n. 8 . 
1 8 . Cfr. c. Di FELICE, March 2 6 , 1 9 7 7 , nn 8 - 1 2 . The concept of a quality principally 
intended and its proof will be discussed in the following sections. Here it is simply 
mentioned in the context of the sentence being discussed. In fact, it could be pointed out that 
the evidence given proving that the wife directly intended to marry a doctor is more 
convincing and clearer than the «evidence» given to support the belief that being a doctor is 
an objectively important quality which affects the very person. 
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previous decision of March 26, 1977 and gives a summary of the argu-
ments contained therein. Again, he reiterates the idea that the wide defini-
tion of the person (as proposed by Canals) is acceptable 1 9. The sentence, 
in addition to citing Alphonsus' third rule, quotes passages from other 
Rotal decisions by Bejan and Ewers which speak about the importance of 
the will or intention of the contracting party. The judge considers these 
sentences, along with the one of March 1977, as those which adhere to 
the more ample interpretation of an error of a quality which redounds in 
the person 2 0 . 
There is a third and more recent decision by Di Felice which moves 
in the same direction and develops this double aspect with even greater 
clarity. The ponens speaks about the third rule of St. Alphonsus and 
indicates other decisions which have accepted this rule. He then 
highlights the aspect of the mutual self-giving of the two spouses which 
takes place in marriage, and afterwards speaks about the two pillars of 
error of a quality which redounds in the person. 
The quality directly or principally intended by the contractant, in order that it 
really redound in the substance, must be objectively evaluated in the same way 
that it is esteemed by society under a social aspect and in the same way as it is 
required to constitute matrimonial life and to maintain the conjugal commu-
nity, which has both a spiritual and corporal character (cf. Adhort. apost. 
Familiaris consortio, 32). In order that it constitute the object of matrimonial 
consent, however, the subjective determination of the contractant is required as 
well; that is, that he greatly values the quality and directly and principally in-
tends the same 2 1 . 
19. «Iamvero in una Augustona diei 26 martii 1977, videntibus quinque, ediximus 
errorem qualitatis redundantem in errorem personae, de quo in praefato canone statuitur, 
ampliori sensu accipi posse, prout est error qualitatis moralis socialis iuridicae, quae, etsi 
aliis communis, personam in sua natura individual peculiari ratione désignât», c. Di FELICE, 
January 14, 1978, n. 3. In the previous instance of this cause, the judge (Agustoni) clearly 
manifests himself against this interpretation. 
20. It should be noted that this sentence of Di Felice also discusses the validity of an 
evolutionary interpretation of the law, canonical equity and the concept of dolo. It is 
interesting to note that this decision overturns two previous Rotal sentences. 
21 . «Qualitas directe et principaliter intenta a nupturiente, ut revera redundet in sub-
stantiam, obiective consideranda est prouti a coetu hominum sub respectu sociali aestimatur 
atque prout exigitur ad constituendum consortium vitae coniugalis ac ad servandam coniuga-
lem communionem, quae indolem simul spiritualem et corporalem habet (cf. Adhort. apost. 
Familiaris consortio, 32). Ad constituendum autem obiectum consensus matrimonialis requi-
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This decision granted the nullity because the plaintiff erred concern-
ing the marital status of her partner, which was considered an important 
qua l i ty 2 2 . Of course, the sentence mentions Canals' decision which 
maintains the same line of thought (a matrimony was declared null be-
cause one of the contractants was civilly married). 
Judge Pompedda, in a decision on July 28,1980, would also seem to 
promote this double aspect (objective and subjective) in order to appreci-
ate an error of a quality which redounds in the person 2 3 . Given this rea-
soning, the sentence must demonstrate the objective importance of the 
quality, and also, that this particular quality was principally and directly 
intended by the contracting party. The cause is very similar to one already 
seen. The plaintiff, Patricia, accuses her marriage because she thought her 
husband had a doctoral degree in Political Science and a socially important 
position 2 4 ; she charges the bond as null precisely when she finds out he 
did not hold a title in the medical profession. The tribunal decides in favor 
of the nullity. 
As in the anterior cause, more importance and weight are given to the 
will or intention of Patricia than to the objective importance. The evidence 
for the latter is weak: the argument virtually becomes a tautology as the 
decision simply states that there is no denying the importance of an aca-
demic title whether one looks at it from the social point of view or from 
the viewpoint of matrimonial l i fe 2 5 . The reasoning is circular (i.e., the 
ritur etiam subiectiva determinatio nupturientis, ut ipse magni faciat qualitatis compartis 
eamque directe et principaliter intendat», c. Dl FELICE, November 16, 1985, n. 10, in fine. 
22 . «Qualitas, in qua erravit actrix ad coniugium ineundum, obiective considerata sub 
respectu sociali, prout a coetu bominum aestimatur atque exigitur ad constituendum con-
sortium coniugale, maximi momenti est, cum statum liberum compartis respiciat», c. Dl 
FELICE, November 16, 1985, n. 11. This is the first phrase of the in facto part of the cause. 
2 3 . «Quo posito principio, attentio iam poni debet super duobus elementis quae, 
Patrum sententia, definire valent irritantem errorem qualitatis redundantem in errorem 
personae, ex quibus alteram spectat ad subiectum seu contrahentem, alteram vero spectat ad 
obiectum seu qualitatem intentam», c. POMPEDDA, July 28, 1980, n. 2 in fine. 
24 . Cfr. c. POMPEDDA, July 28, 1980, n. 13. 
25 . «Certo qualitates et conditiones personales viri conventi iam obiective maximi 
ponderis sunt faciendae, eo potissimum si spectentur connexae et influxum substantialem 
exercentes in vitam coniugalem», c. POMPEDDA, July 28, 1980, n. 14. 
«Ita nemo negare poterit titulum academicum necnon munus iam obtentum spectare ad 
qualitates substantiales personae ratione habita communitatis cum altera persona 
instaurandae necnon familiae condendae: idque nedum abstracte et in genere, sed reapse in 
casu concreto et in intentione mulieris», c. POMPEDDA, July 28, 1980, n. 17. 
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quality is important because it is important). Once again, from the objec-
tive point of view, the absence of the quality did not cause any marital 
problems as regards the consortium vitae which lasted for three years 2 6 . 
The real break comes when Patricia realizes the true situation about 
Victor, her husband. He himself states that this was a key moment for 
Patricia; from this moment she considered her matrimony null 2 7 . 
Evidently, the subjective aspect carries more weight; this was the key 
moment in the fracture of the relationship while the objective importance 
is relegated to a very secondary or even completely unimportant place. 
Little (or nothing) was said about the effect the absence of this quality had 
on the relationship between the couple. Patricia and Victor lived together 
for three years without her thinking of Victor as a «completely different 
person». But still, despite these facts, the sentence seems to want to rec-
ognize the error as affecting the very substance of the respondent and 
therefore making the consent null 2 8 . 
It would seem that the appreciation of this substantial change in the 
person is precisely what makes this objectiveness so difficult. The criteria 
for this «objectification» never seems to solidify into concrete rules 2 9 . 
The «problem» seems to center around the reluctance of the jurisprudence 
to «let-go» of the classical notion of error redundans, especially in what 
refers to the physical person. In this regard, one could say that Canals' 
famous decision of 1970 is accepted and rejected. As has been mentioned, 
it received some heavy criticism and led to some contradictory decisions. 
However, the concept that the person should be considered in his/her to-
tality remained in subsequent jurisprudence. Rotai judges were reluctant 
to give up this «tangible» aspect of error redundans and put all of the 
26 . Cfr. c. POMPEDDA, July 28, 1980, n. 1. 
27 . The husband declares: «Quando mia moglie venne a conoscenza di questi fatti, la 
sua prima reazione fu scioccante ... dopo el choc iniziale, l'azione di mia moglie è stata più 
cosciente, ... Faccio notare che Patrizia, al momento della mia reale situazione, aveva detto a 
D. Ottavio, me presente, che avrebbe chiesto l'annullamento del matrimonio», c. POMPEDDA, 
July 28, 1980, n. 12. 
28 . «Pressius utcumque videre debemus an error reapse adfuerit idemque substantialis 
idest afficiens ipsam personam conventi atque dein an exinde consensus praestiti nullitas 
certo sequatur», c. POMPEDDA, July 28, 1980, n. 12 in fine. 
29 . Delgado also mentions the problem of objectively classifying a certain quality. 
Cfr. G. DELGADO, Error y matrimonio canònico, Pamplona 1975, pp. 152-165. This work 
also deals with some of the jurisprudence delt with in this study. 
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nullifying power in the area of the intention of the contracting parties. 
Surely, this reluctance stemmed from the influence of the classical 
doctrine concerning error redundans (that an accidental quality could not 
nullify a marriage) and the classical concept of the matrimony as the ius in 
corpus. 
B. Changes in the concept of matrimony which have influenced the 
notion of «error redundans» 
Before entering into a detailed study of St. Alphonsus' third rule and 
how it was used in Rotal jurisprudence, this section briefly mentions 
some of the changes in focus concerning key elements of matrimony 
which were introduced with Vatican II. These ideas help to better under-
stand the concept of a quality principally and directly intended. 
As is well known, in the former concept of matrimony, the primary 
emphasis or foundation was based on the ius in corpus. Therefore, the 
most important aspect of the matrimonial bond was the physical person 
and the rights and obligations which revolved around this specific aspect 
of the matrimonial alliance. For this reason, it is not surprising that one 
sentence, which adheres to the strict interpretation, considers the physical 
persons to be the material object of matrimony while the formal object in-
cludes the rights and obligations concerning the ius coeundi30. 
However, after the advent of Vatican U, a new emphasis is placed on 
the mutual self-giving of the spouses by means of an act of the will. The 
Council teaches that the conjugal community is established with the per-
sonal and irrevocable consent of the contracting parties 3 1 , and it is by this 
human act that the spouses mutually give and receive one another 3 2 . The 
Council clearly states that marital consent includes this mutual self-giving 
30 . «Quare consensus matrimonialis pro obiecto materiale habet physicas ipsas con-
trahentium personas, pro obiecto formali, seu essentiali, ius et officium mutuum in corpus 
seu ius coèndi», c. FERRARO, July 18, 1972, n. 20. 
3 1 . The first sentence of Gaudium et Spes, n. 48, thus states: «Intima communitas 
vitae et amoris coniugalis, a Creatore condita suisque legibus instructa, foedere coniugii seu 
irrevocabili consensu personali instaurate». 
32 . «Ita actu humano, quo coniuges sese mutuo tradunt atque accipiunt...». Gaudium et 
Spes, n. 48. 
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and acceptance in order to establish this «communitas vitae et amoris co-
niugalis». 
Evidently, Roman auditors are confronted with a new focus and em-
phasis in what pertains to the essence of the matrimonial bond. The mari-
tal consent, an act of the will by which the spouses mutually receive and 
give themselves to the other, is once again acknowledge and confirmed as 
the origin of the matrimonial bond. 
What is interesting to point out is that the object of this consent em-
barks much more than the ius in corpus 3 3 . Surely this aspect of matri-
monial life is included here, but there is a greater emphasis on the 
«consortium totius vitae»: the sharing of a common and lasting lifetime 
partnership. This line of thought is clearly and concisely assumed by the 
legislator in canons 1055 § 1 and 1057 § 2. 
Judge Serrano makes reference to this evolution of thought as pro-
posed by Vatican II. He believes that the formal object of consent is 
no longer simply the perpetual and exclusive ius in corpus. After Vatican 
II, the matrimonial consent also includes the right to a conjugal life and 
its corresponding obligations 3 4 . With this brief discussion about the 
new focus of matrimonial consent, it will be easier to understand the 
concept of a quality principally and directly intended as used in Rotal 
jurisprudence. 
3 3 . For a work about the essence of matrimony Cfr. E. MOLANO, Contribución al 
estudio sobre la esencia del matrimonio, Pamplona 1977. Specifically concerning the 
evolution of thought about the ius in corpus Cfr. pp. 223-226. 
3 4 . «Sed cum sub luce et inspiratone Concilii Vaticani II clarius ac praecisius -potius 
quam diverse- essentia matrimonii intelligeretur, personae coniugum potiorem quam ligitime 
habent, in pacto accipiunt partem ex magis completa notione s.d. obiecti consensus 
coniugalis: "Rectius itaque consensus matrimonialis definitur: actus voluntatis quo vir et 
mulier foedere inter se seu irrevocabili consensu constituunt consortium vitae coniugalis, 
perpetuum et exclusivum, indole sua naturali ad prolem educandam et generandam ordinatum'. 
»'Obiectum' exinde 'formale' istius consensus est non tantum ius in corpus, perpetuum et 
exclusivum, in ordine ad actus per se aptos ad prolis generationem, excluso omni alio ele-
mento formali essentiali, sed complectitur etiam ius ad vitae consortium seu communitatem 
vitae, quae proprie dicitur matrimonialis, necnon correlativas obligationes, seu ius ad 'inti-
mam personarum atque operum coniunctionem', qua 'se invicem perficiunt ut ad novorum 
viventium procreationem et educationem cum Deo operam sociant' (Enc. Humanae Vitae) 
[cfr. 5. R. Rotae Decis., vol. LXI (1969) 183-184; in una coram ANNE, diei 25 februarii 
1969]"», c. SERRANO, May 28, 1982, n. 15. 
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C. A Brief History of St. Alphonsus' Third Rule in older Rotal 
Jurisprudence 
While the Canalian interpretation of error redundans received a fair 
amount of criticism and led auditors to opposing interpretations and a 
certain uncertainty concerning the appreciation of a quality which re-
dounds in the person, another, but by no means new, interpretation began 
to spring up and form a distinct current: St. Alphonsus' third rule. 
The Third Rule of St. Alphonsus reappeared and was frequently 
quoted even before the promulgation of the new code. Some decisions 
-but it is not an exhaustive list- which mention this rule include: c. Canals, 
April 21 , 1970 (n. 2), c. Ewers, February 10, 1973, (n. 3 ) 3 5 , c. Pinto, 
November 12, 1973, (n. I I ) 3 6 , c. Di Felice, March 26, 1977, (n. 3 ) 3 7 , c. 
Ferraro, July 18, 1972, (n. 14) 3 8 , c. Agustoni, October 15, 1976, (nn. 7-
8), c. Di Felice, January 14, 1978, (n. 3), c. Pompedda, November 25, 
1978, (n. 7), c. Stankiewicz, February 15, 1980, (n. 5), c. Serrano, 
May 28, 1982, (n. 8 ) 3 9 , c. Stankiewicz, February 24, 1983. As is 
obvious, this «Third Rule» has had a great impact on the more recent 
jurisprudence. 
Precisely because this interpretation has been adopted by the new 
code, it is worthwhile spending some time studying older but frequently 
cited jurisprudence from earlier years which also accepts this rule. In 
particular, there are four interesting decisions by William Heard, the first 
Roman auditor to declare a matrimony null on the grounds of a quality 
principally and directly intended. Since both doctrine and jurisprudence 
often quote, comment, and criticize these decisions (especially the one of 
June 21 , 1941), and because these sentences are precursors to the 
jurisprudence which follows, it is important, even if in general terms, to 
be familiar with the arguments presented in these causes. 
35 . This judge does not explicity mention St. Alphonsus, but he does speak about a 
quality principally intended. 
36 . Judge Pinto cites the third rule, but considers it an implicit condition. 
37 . In this sentence, the text of the third rule is badly cited. 
3 8 . This judge seems to accept the rule of St. Alphonsus as valid. However, he points 
out that it would be difficult to prove in the external forum. As has been noted, this judge, in 
deciding the cause, applied the strict interpretation of error redundans. 
3 9 . This auditor rechannels the third rule of St. Alphonsus to a condition. 
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1. The Decision «coram» Heard, June 21, 1941 
Along with the sentence given by Canals on April 21, 1970, this is 
probably one of the most important pieces of jurisprudence dealing with 
the chapter of error of the person 4 0 . The facts of the cause concern a man, 
who in keeping with the traditions of his country (Pakistan), commissions 
a third party to look for an eligible person with the specification that she 
be virgin. After encountering a girl believed to have the desired quality 
and the future husband having seen the bride-to-be, the price for a virgin 
is paid out (as specified by the local custom), and Eleazar Somra and 
Imelda Etowari were married. However, upon discovering that his wife 
was deflowered, Eleazar immediately rejected Imelda, not only in words, 
but also in deeds. 
The in iure of the sentence cites canon 1083 4 1 and then quotes the 
three Alphonsian rules to help in the difficult matter of determining when 
an error of quality redounds in error of the person. Two observations are 
made concerning this third rule, that is, when the contractant directly and 
principally intends the quality and less principally the person. First, it is 
extremely difficult to prove such an intention in the external forum unless 
it were formulated as a condition or pact, but nevertheless, it is not 
absolutely excluded that, in certain circumstances, a prevailing intention 
can obviously be demonstrated. The second observation is that canon 
1083 (of the 1917 code) does not require proof of a condition or a pact, 
and clearly insinuates that there might exist another way (alia via) or 
manner of proving, even in the external forum, that an error of quality 
becomes an error concerning the person 4 2 . 
4 0 . The references to this sentence in Rotal jurisprudence and doctrine are manifestly 
known; for this reason the cause is commented in some detail. As an example, Prof. A. 
Mostaza says of this cause: for the first time in history, a matrimony is declared null because 
of error of a common quality. Cfr. A. MOSTAZA, El error doloso como causa de nulidad del 
matrimonio candnico, in «Trabajos de la XV Semana de Derecho Can6nico», Salamanca 
1976, p. 154. 
4 1 . The text of the sentence mistakenly says «Ex. can. 1013», c. HEARD, June 21, 
1941, n. 2. 
42 . «Verum quidem est in foro externo vix fieri posse quod talis intentio probetur et 
admittatur, quin fuerit in conditionem deducta vel pactum; sed non est absolute exclusum dari 
casum in quo, per circumstantias, praevalens intentio valeat demonstrari. Citatus canon 
1083 dum ponit errorem circa qualitatem personae matrimonium dirimere quoties 'error 
qualitatis redundet in errorem personae' et silet omnino de necessitate habendi conditionem 
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Applying the law to the facts of this matrimonial cause demonstrates 
this «other way». Taking into account the circumstances and the local 
customs which govern marriage, the sentence declared that Eleazar Somra 
directly and principally intended the quality of virginity in the woman who 
was to be his wife more than the woman herself. The following evidence 
is given: 
i) Before the wedding. 
According to local custom, women are divided into two very distinct 
categories: virgins and widows. The price of «buying» and marrying a 
virgin is 20-25 rupees while the price of a widow is 12 rupees 4 3 . Eleazar 
paid the price for a virgin. 
ii) At the moment of the marriage. 
There is no doubt that Eleazar was certain about the desired condition 
of his spouse. The sentence describes the match-maker as an honest man 
who was himself deceived by the tutor of Imelda 4 4 . 
Hi) After the marriage. 
«In this case, that the matrimony is to be held as null because of the 
will prevalently tending to a virgin more than a woman is clearly evident 
from the dismissal of the woman, the restitution, with a fine, of the price 
paid and the expulsion from the cas te» 4 5 . In addition to these facts, 
several declarations of Eleazar are gathered which clearly indicate his 
mind in marrying: 
«How reluctant Somra was about accepting a non-virgin is best shown from 
his manner of acting immediately upon receiving the news of Imelda's preg-
nancy: «I stipulated that she never return to me; she never did return. I com-
plained to my uncle about her and told him I would never reclaim the girl. I 
said these things in order that I be free from the matrimonial bond. I went to a 
missionary and told him, 'I will never accept that girl as a wife'» 4 6 . 
Basing its decision on these facts, the tribunal declared the marriage 
null on the grounds of error redounding in error of the person (canon 
aut pactum ad id probandum, clare insinuât et aliam viam patere posse ad ostendendum etiam 
in foro externo errorem qualitatis in personam verti», c. HEARD, June 21, 1941, n. 2 in fine. 
4 3 . Cfr. c. H E A R D , June 21, 1941, n. 4. 
4 4 . Cfr. c. H E A R D , June 21, 1941, n. 5. 
4 5 . C. H E A R D , June 21, 1941, n. 5. 
46 . C. HEARD, June 21, 1941, n. 5. 
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1083 § 2, I o ) . The error suffered by the petitioner did not concern a qual-
ity which would identify one unique person nor did it specifically identify 
Imelda for Eleazar, but rather, the error concerned a common quality 
greatly desired by the husband to the point of being principally and di-
rectly intended as part of the marriage contract. As one author points out, 
we would now be confronted with a ratification of the well-known for-
mula of St. Alphonsus, that is to say, we now have a new way of inter-
preting error redundans which is distinct from mere error qualitatis47. 
It may be observed that Heard's use of St. Alphonsus' rule was not 
passively accepted in all the canonical circles. Fedele comments this 
decision in an article published in 1953. Even though the Italian canonist 
does not feel that the sentence erred in granting the nullity, he does con-
sider that the sentence has confused or mixed the concepts of error, inten-
tion and condition. Error redundans, for Fedele, will rarely occur since he 
requires (as the classical doctrine does) that the spouses be unknown and 
that the person be determined by the desired quality 4 8 . 
2. The Decision «coram» Heard, August 7, 1948 
This is a short cause which has raised some speculation as to the 
auditor's adherence to St. Alphonsus' doctrine. 
Edward and Elsa were married on September 17, 1935. Soon after 
the wedding, Edward finds out that his wife had been sterilized; he im-
mediately leaves her and obtains a civil divorce. In 1939, the husband 
seeks an annulment in Ecclesiastical court for fear and error. The grounds 
of fear is rejected, but the nullity is granted for error. When the cause is 
appealed, the first instance decision is overturned, and the marriage is de-
4 7 . «Estaríamos, por tanto, ante una ratificación de la conocida fòrmula de S. Alfonso 
M. de Ligorio, es decir, ante una nueva forma de interpretar el error redundans, corno distinto 
del simple error qualitatis». T. RINCÓN, La «Qualitas» y el «Error in Personam», in «Ius 
Canonicum» 12 (1972), p. 354. 
4 8 . Cfr. P. FEDELE, Analisi di recenti sentenze ecclesiastiche in tema di nullità di 
matrimonio, in «Ephemerides Iuris Canonici» 9 (1953), pp. 399-400. 
Other articles concerning error by this canonist include the following:// tema de error 
qualitatis redundans in errorem personae, in «Ephemerides Iuris Canonici» 10 (1954), pp. 
304-312; Error qualitatis redundans in errorem personae, in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» 
(1934), pp. 175-202; Ancora in tema di «error qualitatis redundans in errorem personae-», in 
«Ephemerides Iuris Canonici» 6 (1950), pp. 149-155. 
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clared valid. Thus the case arrives to the Roman Rota in third instance for 
a final decision concerning the chapter of error. 
In setting forth the principles of law, the ponens maintains that canon 
1083 § 2 «cannot really be distinguished from the error which is dealt 
with in the first paragraph, since then it (error redounding in error of the 
person) would only come about when dealing with a quality which is 
proper to one person and which is precisely intended* 4 9 . Taken by itself, 
this comment would seem to contradict what Heard maintained in the 
previous decision studied, and it appears that he now favors the traditional 
doctrine or Sanchez's strict interpretation of error redundans. Mostaza, 
classifying this sentence as one which rejects the third Alphonsian rule, 
cites this passage to show that Heard has either changed opinion or con-
tradicts himself 5 0. 
Although Prof. Mostaza's argument is a strong one, there is evidence 
that the previously quoted statement of the Roman auditor does not neces-
sarily undermine or openly contradict what he maintains in the cause of 
June 21, 1941. In the first place, there is no mention of St. Alphonsus' 
rules in the decision we are studying. Heard simply asserts that canon 
1083 § 2, when interpreted in the strict sense, is a corollary of the first 
paragraph of the same canon, and therefore, the two are substantially the 
same 5 1 . He makes no reference to the aliam viam mentioned in the 1941 
sentence. 
Moreover, the auditor afterwards speaks about error of a quality 
which does not redound in the person but does, however, have the power 
to make the marriage void. This happens «when the quality was categori-
cally placed in the same way as (tanquam) a condition sine qua non. For, 
4 9 . «Sed iste error qualitatis redundans in errorem personae revera non distinguitur ab 
errore de quo in paragrapho prima, nam tune tantum habetur quando versatur circa qualitatem 
quae uni personae propria est ac quae praecise intenditur», c. HEARD, August 7, 1948,'n. 2. 
5 0 . «Y en la segunda c. HEARD se contradice paladinamente lo afirmado en la famosa 
causa de Dinajpur de 21-VI-1941, ante el mismo Auditor, ya que se nos dice, con la doctrina 
tradicional, que el error redundante no se distingue del error sobre la persona...». A. 
MOSTAZA, El error doloso como causa de nulidad del matrimonio canónico, en «Trabajos de la 
XV Semana de Derecho Canónico», Salamanca 1976, p. 163. 
5 1 . Part of the doctrine has maintained the same idea. Cfr. J.M. MANS PuiGARNAU, El 
error de cualidad en el matrimonio ante la reforma del código de derecho canónico, Barcelona, 
1964, p. 14. 
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one who acts in such a manner principally desires the quality, and there-
fore, if the quality is lacking, there is no consent* 5 2. 
As can be seen, the sentence maintains that error of a quality which is 
principally intended affects the very matrimonial consent. Heard is not 
speaking about a quality which redounds in the person (error qualitatis re-
dundans in error em personae) which he previously discussed in this 
cause, rather he is now referring to a quality principally intended which he 
likens to a condition sine qua non. The auditor uses two different terms 
for two different concepts, both of which have a voiding effect upon the 
matrimony 5 3 . 
Perhaps what would be more difficult to explain is the reason why 
Heard reverts to or includes the case of condition in his argument. It could 
be that the first instance decision, which the Auditor quotes, includes this 
chapter in its reasoning. It may be that he supports himself in the figure of 
condition (which was recognized by the code as a valid chapter of annul-
ment) to better explain a «qualitas principaliter volita» since, as was 
noted, his well-known decision of June 21, 1941 was submitted to some 
early criticism. In any case, it seems that Heard is moving in the area of 
an error which has a direct influence upon the will and not in the field of 
error redundans taken in the strict sense. 
For these reasons, it appears that this sentence is not a flat-out 
rejection of the third Alphonsian rule. In fact, Heard uses the principles of 
this rule (although he likens it to a condition) to solve the cause. The 
ponens points out that the plaintiff did not have this quality in mind, nor 
did he have any preconceived ideas about his partner concerning this 
quality 5 4 . 
5 2 . «Error circa qualitatem quae non redundat in personae tunc tantum matrimonium 
irritat cuando haec qualitas praecise posita fuit tanquam conditio sine qua non, nam qui sic 
facit, qualitatem principaliter vult, ideoque deficiente qualitate deest consensus*, c. H E A R D , 
August 7, 1948, n. 2. Prof. Mostaza also cites this text in his critique of the sentence being 
studied. 
5 3 . Disentangling terminology and concepts in the area of error facti has often been a 
stumbling block in jurisprudence and doctrine. Cfr. V. D E REINA, Error y dolo en el matri-
monio candnico, Pamplona 1967, pp. 108-122. Also A. M O S T A Z A , El error doloso como 
causa de nulidad del matrimonio candnico, en «Trabajos de la XV Semana de Derecho 
Can6nico», Salamanca 1976, pp. 157-160. 
5 4 . Cfr. c. H E A R D , August 7, 1948, n. 3. 
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3. The Decision «coram» Heard, November 12, 1955 
Heard's decision of 1955 adheres to the opinion that an error of qual-
ity voids the marriage only if this quality identifies one specific person or 
if the quality was placed as a condition sine qua non. In this latter case, 
though, the ponens maintains that one has moved into a new chapter of 
nullity (that of condition) 5 5. 
That the ponens focuses this particular cause in terms of condition is 
evident in both the in iure and in facto parts of the sentence. He esteems 
that the plaintiffs intention to marry a virgin should be classified as a 
mere proposition, but not as a condition 5 6. 
It would seem, therefore that this sentence (even more than the previ-
ous one) indicates a change of opinion on the part of Judge Heard. He 
openly redirects the entire cause to the figure of condition (in his opinion, 
a completely different chapter of nullity) even though the marriage was 
accused on the grounds of error. At the same time, it is interesting to note 
that he does not mention the third rule of St. Alphonsus as a valid inter-
pretation of error of quality 5 7. 
4. The Decision «coram» Heard, January 14, 1956 
This is the fourth and last decision to be studied by Judge Heard. The 
decision deals with a couple who lived together ten years before contract-
ing marriage. In order not to scandalize his mother and sister who came to 
live with the couple, Sanctus, the husband, decides to marry Josephine; 
the wedding takes place on June 28, 1943. 
5 5 . «Error circa qualitatem personae, etsi dans causam contractui, non irritat, nisi in 
errorem personae redundet: quod evenire nequit, nisi versetur circa qualitatem uni personae 
propriam. Qui ergo vult ducere virginem, et, ex errore, ducit scortum, valide contrahit, nisi 
virginitatis qualitas ut conditio sine qua non posita fuerit, sed, hoc in casu, contractus irritus 
fit non vi erroris (can. 1083), sed vi conditionis appositae et non verificatae (can. 1092)», 
c. HEARD, November 12, 1955, n. 2. 
56 . «Sed sub 'questa idea', de qua actor, vix et ne vix quidem introspici potest 
conditio, sive generalis, sive circa matrimonium de quo agitur, sed merum propositum ... 
Idest, sicut alii homines honesti, propositum habuit ducendi virginem», c. H E A R D , 
November 12, 1955, n. 3. Cfr. as well n. 4. 
57 . As was mentioned already, this may be due to the early criticism which his 1941 
decision received, as well as the fact that condition was recoginized in the 1917 code as 
having nullifying power. 
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Because it was impossible to obtain the necessary documents for 
Josephine in order to marry, the couple went to a public notary. There, 
Josephine affirmed to have been born in 1906 of noble parentage and that 
her father was a lawyer. After the war, Josephine having suffered a frac-
tured thigh and being convalescent in a hospital, Sanctus leaves for an-
other city and solicits authentic documentation concerning the true age and 
social status of his wife. Sanctus then accuses the bond on grounds of er-
ror concerning a quality redounding in error of the person since Josephine 
was not the daughter of a noble family nor was her father a lawyer. He 
also accuses the matrimony because of a non-verified condition concern-
ing the age of his wife. The first instance court declared the matrimony 
valid 5 8 . 
Judge Heard, after asserting that error causam dans does not nullify 
marriage, states: «At times, however, in the mind of the contracting party, 
the notion of the person cedes to the notion of the quality to such a degree 
that the quality is substantially intended while the person only acciden-
tally. In this case, error concerning a quality becomes substantial, that is, 
it redounds in error of the person» 5 9 . With these words, Heard describes 
when an error concerning an accidental quality can substantially affect the 
consent to the point of voiding the matrimony. 
Immediately afterwards, the decision continues: «This error, though, 
can scarcely be conceived unless it is between spouses who beforehand 
were personally unknown to each other, such that, only through the qual-
ity was the person known» 6 0 . The sentence continues citing a well-
known text of Gasparri asserting that simple error of quality which is the 
cause of the contract does not affect the validity unless it were placed as a 
condition sine qua non 6 1 . 
5 8 . Cfr. c. HEARD, January 14, 1956, n. 1. 
5 9 . «Aliquando, vero, in mente contrahentis ratio personae adeo cedit rationi quali-
tatis, ut haec substantialiter, ilia vero nonnisi accidentaliter intendatur, quo in casu error 
circa qualitatem substantialis fit, seu redundat, in personam», c. HEARD, January 14, 1956, 
n. 2. This paragraph is very frequently quoted in subsequent jurisprudence. 
60 . «Qui tamen error vix concipi potest, nisi inter sponsos antea invicem personaliter 
prorsus ignotos, ita ut, per qualitatem tantum, persona cognoscatur», c. Heard, January 14, 
1956, n. 2. 
6 1 . C. HEARD, January 14, 1956, n. 2, in fine. 
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Once again, there is a certain mixture of ideas and terms. On the one 
hand, the Rotal sentence recognizes that, at times, the contracting party's 
intention may be so vehemently directed towards the quality that this 
quality becomes a substantial part of the will; this binding of the will to 
the quality is so strong that when this quality is lacking there is no 
consent. In this decision, Heard classifies this error as redounding in the 
person: «quo in casu error circa qualitatem substantialis fit, seu redundat, 
in personam*. This reasoning seems to favor the line of thought as given 
by St. Alphonsus' third rule. On the other hand, the decision continues 
by saying that such an error can hardly be conceived unless the spouses 
are personally unknown to each other. This favors Sanchez's school of 
thought. And finally, the concept of a condition sine qua non is brought 
into play. What doctrine or school of thought, then, does this sentence 
promote as apt for solving the cause? Does the auditor favor the strict 
interpretation of error redundans or does he put more weight on the will 
of the person? How does condition fit into all of this? 
A look at how the law is applied to the facts of the cause may help to 
answer some of these questions. In this section of the sentence, it is first 
demonstrated that the plaintiff did not enter into marriage with a condition 
concerning the nobility of his spouse's family nor the profession of her 
father. He married to avoid a scandal with his own family or perhaps for a 
religious motive 6 2 . 
With the case of condition being rejected, it is significant that the 
sentence does not simply reject the possibility of error because the 
spouses knew each other for ten years before marrying. Proceeding in 
this manner would indicate that the auditor is partial to the strict interpre-
tation of error redundans. Instead, Judge Heard cites a passage of the first 
instance sentence which explicitly invokes the third Alphonsian rule as 
grounds for declaring the nullity. In response, the Rotal sentence makes 
evident that one is not in the area of a quality principally intended, but 
rather in the area of error causam dans, using the following testimony of 
the husband: «1 admit that these (the qualities) were determining factors 
6 2 . Cfr. c. HEARD, January 14, 1956, n. 3. 
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which induced me to marriage» 6 3 . The qualities desired by the petitioner 
in marrying, in the opinion of Heard, were too trivial to form the preva-
lent or pervading object of the wil l 6 4 ; the verdict is non constare de nulli-
tate matrimonii, in casu. 
One final observation may be worth noting. Even though in the in 
iure part of this cause there is a certain tendency to liken or virtually 
equate the figures of error in qualitate directe etprincipaliter intenta and 
condition sine qua non, the in facto part of the sentence resolves them as 
two separate questions or chapters of nullity. 
Thus, Judge Heard was the first Rotal auditor to actually invoke the 
third Alphonsian rule in order to nullify a matrimony 6 5 . The decision was 
widely commented and often criticized. Despite this cool reception, 
Heard, in two subsequent causes, maintains that an error of quality prin-
cipally and directly intended is a valid grounds for declaring a matrimony 
null. 
These decisions serve as an introduction to the topic of error of qual-
ity principally and directiy intended; they present the main arguments and 
complications concerning this chapter of nullity. A study of more recent 
jurisprudence should help to better understand what the Rota is proposing 
as valid solutions and limits for this juridical figure. 
D. A quality principally and directly intended 
While some Rotal decisions demanded that the quality be subjectively 
desired and objectively important, other sentences began putting more 
stress and attention on a quality principally intended by one of the contrac-
tants. Many auditors quote St. Thomas' famous passage concerning a 
woman who consents to marry the son of the king (whoever he may be) 
6 3 . «...confermo che esse furono determinanti ad indurmi al matrimonio...», c. 
H E A R D , January 14, 1956, n. 3. 
64 . «Ceterum, qualitates, de quibus agitur: idest, aliqua propinquitas collateralis cum 
nobili familia C , et titulus advocati a pâtre conventae obtentus, nimis triviales sunt, ut pos-
sint praevalentis voluntatis obiectum formare», c. HEARD, January 14, 1956, n. 3, in fine. 
6 5 . Two previous Rotal decisions had explicitly mentioned this juridical figure, but 
they did not decide in favor of granting the nullity. The decisions were c. MORI in 1910 and 
c. MANNUCCI, June 20, 1932. 
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and the third rule of St. Alphonsus concerning a person who specifically 
desires to marry a noblewoman; other auditors cite the innovative decision 
of Heard in 1941 6 6 . 
The overall importance of the contractant's intention becomes more 
and more evident even before the Code of 1983. One auditor boldly 
contradicted the classical doctrine maintaining that firm and proven 
jurisprudence of the Roman Rota accepts an error of an accidental quality 
as capable of nullifying a marriage. When the quality is of great 
importance for the contracting party, it may well redound in error of the 
person 6 7 . However, this concept was not previously unknown. A text by 
Heard which has already been mentioned appears many times in the 
decisions concerning this study. The text reads as follows: «At times, 
however, in the mind of the contracting party the notion of the person 
cedes to the notion of the quality to such a degree, that the quality is 
substantially intended while the person only accidentally. In this case, 
error concerning a quality becomes substantial, that is, it redounds in 
error of the person» 6 8 . This same paragraph is later used by Bejan in a 
decision of July 16, 1969 6 9 , and is cited by E w e r s 7 0 , Di Fe l i ce 7 1 , 
66 . S o m e s e n t e n c e s w h i c h turn to support in St. T h o m a s , St. A l p h o n s u s or Heard's 
d e c i s i o n include: c. AGUSTONI, October 15, 1976, n. 7; c. POMPEDDA, N o v e m b e r 25, 1978, 
n. 7; c. POMPEDDA, July 23, 1980, n. 5; c. STANKIEWICZ, February 24, 1983, nn. 3-4; c. 
PARISELLA, June 16, 1983, n. 25; c. JARAWAN, D e c e m b e r 18, 1984, n. 2; c. STANKIEWICZ, 
January 24, 1984, n. 7; c. COLAGIOVANNI, N o v e m b e r 22, 1983, n. 15; c. STANKIEWICZ, 
D e c e m b e r 19, 1985, n. 14. 
67 . « U n d e sat firma atque probata censenda est iurisprudentia N . F . pro interpretatione 
erroris qualitatis acc idental i s m a g n i m o m e n t i in aest imat ione nupturientis prout redundantis 
in errorem personae , ex quo matr imonium irritum fit», c. D i FELICE, January 14, 1978, n. 4 
in fine. 
68 . « A l i q u a n d o , vero , in m e n t e contrahentis ratio personae adeo ced i t rationi qual i -
tatis, ut h a e c substantial i ter, i l ia vero nonnis i accidental i ter intendatur, q u o in c a s u error 
circa qual i tatem substantialis fit, s eu redundat in personam», c. HEARD, January 14, 1956, n. 
2 . 
6 9 . Cfr. c. BEJAN, July 16, 1969, n. 11, w h i c h literally quotes the text o f Heard adding 
at the beg inning: «Haud infitiamur quod, al iquando, in m e n t e contrahent i s . . . » . Bejan , c i t ing 
Heard's 1956 d e c i s i o n , later mit igates his stance by stating that this error c o u l d ex i s t only 
b e t w e e n s p o u s e s w h o w e r e u n k n o w n to e a c h other or by redirect ing this f igure into a 
c o n d i t i o n sine qua non. Heard's s tance concern ing this aspect w a s already treated in the 
p r e v i o u s s e c t i o n . 
7 0 . Cfr. c. EWERS, February 10, 1973, n. 3. 
7 1 . Cfr. c. Di FELICE, January 14, 1978, n. 4. 
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Huot 7 2 , and Giannecchini 7 3 all of whom attribute the text to Bejan. As is 
obvious, this passage has had a fairly big influence on Rotal jurisprudence, 
and for this reason it is highlighted here again. 
The trend is clear. Rotal jurisprudence began accepting the idea that 
an accidental quality, when direcdy and principally intended, could nullify 
a marriage because the error redounded in the person, or in other words, 
because of substantial error. This current is present in Rotal jurisprudence 
all through the 1970s and up to the present. Canals specifically cites the 
third rule of St. Alphonsus as a valid case for null i ty 7 4 , and in 1976, 
Agustoni approvingly cites Heard's decision of 1 9 4 1 7 5 . In 1980, Judge 
Pompedda proposes a truer and more probable interpretation of canon 
1083 § 2, 1°: a marriage is void when the contractant directly and princi-
pally aims his/her consent towards the quality , and indirectly and subor-
dinate^ towards the person 7 6 . Judge Stankiewicz makes reference to the 
decision c. Mori in 1910 (which seems to be the first decision recorded to 
have cited St. Alpnonsus' rule), and he then goes on to speak about the 
«truer» and «more probable» interpretation of canon 1083 § 2, n. 1° pro-
posed by Pompedda. Stankiewicz adds that both doctrine and jurispru-
dence have always considered this type of error an impeding factor in the 
matrimonial bond 7 7 . 
72 . Cfr. c. HUOT, November 24, 1987, n. 32. 
7 3 . Cfr. decree, c. GIANNECCHINI, March 25, 1983 in F. DELLA ROCCA, Diritto Matri-
moniale Canonico: tavole sinottiche. Secondo volume di aggiornamento, pp. 117-118. 
74 . Cfr. c. CANALS, April 21, 1970, n. 2. 
75 . Cfr. c. AGUSTONI, October 15, 1976, n. 7. 
76 . «Verior igitur atque magis probabilis videtur canonis interpretatio, iuxta quam 
error qualitatis in errorem redundat, ubi ipsa qualitas prae persona intenditur, idest 
ubi contrahens directe et principaliter suum consensum dirigit in qualitatem vel qualitates 
determinatas, indirecte autem et subordinate in personam», c. P O M P E D D A , July 23, 1980, 
n. 5 . 
77 . «At saecularis traditio canonica (Cfr. nn. 3 et 6 d. 3°) nec non iurisprudentia N. 
Fori tenent errorem circa qualitatem directe et principaliter intentam matrimonii nullitatem 
secumferre». The ponens continues: «Profecto «cum consensus directe et principaliter latus 
fuerit in determinatam qualitatem, hac deficiente habetur error substantialis, qui irritât 
matrimonium» [SR. Rotae Decis, vol II (1910) 337, n. 2, coram Mori]. C . STANKIEWICZ, 
February 24, 1983, n. 7. 
The passage by Mori is also cited in the sentence C . JARAWAN, December 18, 1984. 
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1. Relative importance of the objective aspect and absolute 
importance of the subjective aspect 
The judicial current of a quality principally and directly intended be-
gan gaining a wider acceptance in Rotal jurisprudence while the requisite 
that the quality be objectively important began fading and even received 
some direct criticism. The double aspect, however, was not completely 
abandoned by Rotal judges. As is obvious, there is no abrupt cut with the 
one interpretation to take up the other. Some judges continued resorting to 
the objective importance as a requisite for error redundans, but the fact is 
that more and more attention and significance was being attributed to the 
subjective aspect. In other words, it seems that Rotal auditors began giv-
ing greater emphasis to what the contractant thought about the quality than 
to what society or men in general thought about the same quality. 
This manner of thinking can be perceived even among auditors who 
promote the double requirement for error redundans. As was already 
mentioned, despite what Judge Di Felice maintains about the importance 
of the quality looked at from a social point of view, he adds an important 
qualifying observation: «One must not forget that we are in the area of er-
ror, and therefore, we must give the utmost attention to the will of the 
contractant, that is, to the value and importance which the one marrying 
attributes to a specific quality for individualizing the person he wants to 
marry» 7 8 . 
Judge Huot would seem to be another who demands that the quality 
be objectively important as well as subjectively desired 7 9 . However he, 
like Di Felice, puts greater importance on the subjective aspect. This audi-
78 . «Neque oblivioni dari potest nos versari in provincia erroris, ideoque perquam 
maxime attendere debemus ad mentem contrahentis, idest ad valorem et momentum quod ipsa 
tribuit determinatae qualitati pro individuanda ilia persona, quacum contrahere voluit», c. Di 
FELICE, March 26, 1977, n. 4 in fine. 
This same text is cited by C O L A G I O V A N N I , November 22, 1983, n. 16 with the 
introduction: «At sapienter additur in novissime citata sententia», and concludes with the 
following: «ita ut causa dari possit in quo alii ob illam determinatam qualitatem in comparte 
a matrimonio deterreantur, alius vera ab illam contrahat». 
7 9 . «Qualitas vero hie non solum quae objective magni sit ponderis considerari debet 
sed etiam quae in mente contrahentis maximi fit atque directe et principaliter intendatur. In 
provincia enim erroris versamur», c. H U O T , November 24, 1987, n. 29. He continues 
quoting the passage from Di FELICE in the previous footnote. 
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tor points out that the subjective evaluation of the quality desired may not 
necessarily be in accordance with the objective value or importance given 
to this same quality by society. The ponens continues with an interesting 
commentary by O. Fumagalli-Carulli. She maintains that it is of little im-
portance whether or not society greatly esteems a quality which a person 
has directly and principally intended. What does matter is the subjective 
evaluation of the contractantTherefore, an error of quality redounds in the 
person in as much as the quality substitutes the physical individual in the 
intention of the contractant 8 0. 
Judge Palestro, in a decision of June 24, 1987, shows himself to be 
of the same opinion concerning the relative importance of the quality ob-
jectively considered. One must consider, in the opinion of this Roman 
auditor, the subjective evaluation of the quality by the contractant more 
than the objective evaluation by society or the universalissimam cogni-
tionem 8 1 . The ponens explicitly states that one «should acknowledge the 
prevalence of the subjective evaluation over the objective worth of the in-
tended quality» 8 2 . 
While in some decisions Judge Pompedda requires the objective im-
portance of the quality, in general, he seems to put more emphasis on the 
80. «Aestimatio autem subjectiva nubentis bic est consideranda quae non necessario 
concordat cum valore vel momento objectivo qualitatis desideratae. 'Poco importa, da questo 
punto di vista, che la qualità cui il soggetto dirige directe et principaliter la sua volontà sia o 
no stimata dalla società in cui egli vive. Ciò che interessa è la sua valutazione soggettiva, 
poiché Terror qualitatis da simplex diviene redundans soltanto in quanto la qualità sostituisca 
nell'animo del nubente l'indivualità fisica' O. F U M A G A L L I - C A R U L L I , in 77 Diritto Eccle-
siastico, 1981, 2, p. 162», c. H U O T , November 24, 1987, n. 33 , in «Il Diritto Eccle-
siastico» (1988)4, pp. 462-474. 
8 1 . After his praise of Canals' decision, the auditor makes some declarations which 
show that more importance is to be given to the will of the contracting party. «Ast 
praeterquam quod ab obiectum et universalissimam cognitionem qualitatis personae, quae 
tangat ipsam personam, attendi debet ad aestimationem subiectivam contrahentis, quae 
directe et exclusive peculiarem qualitatem alterius contrahentis determinat, quamvis non 
unicam neque exclusivam in individuatione personae, cuius error in aestimatione talis 
qualitatis in personam redundat et coniugium dirimit», c. PALESTRO, June 24, 1987, n. 6, in 
«Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1988)2, pp. 3-13. He goes on to cite a text by Ewers, February 
10, 1973 which states that one must be highly attentive to the will of the erring party. 
82 . The ponent textually cites can. 1097, § 2 and thus concludes: «'ita admittens 
praevalentiam aestimationis subiectivae super obiectivo valore qualitatis intentae' (C/r. 
P.A. B O N N E T , Introduzione al consenso matrimoniale canonico, Milano, 1985, p. 71)», c. 
PALESTRO, June 24, 1987, n. 6, in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1988)2, pp. 3-13. 
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subjective aspect. Besides the sentence already cited where this Roman 
auditor speaks about the truer and more probable definition of error re-
dundans, in another decision, he proposes a similar definition of a quality 
which redounds in the person: when the quality is intended before, or in-
stead of, the other party. The contractant specifically directs his/her will 
towards a person, who is determined by a specific quality, to such a de-
gree that the contractant desires to marry only in as much as the other 
party possesses the desired quality or qualities. Therefore, one ought to 
give importance to the intention of the contractant 8 3. 
The decision by Judge Parisella on June 16, 1983, makes a very in-
teresting distinction or observation concerning the juridical figure of an er-
ror of quality principally intended. The defendant's lawyer tries to accuse 
the matrimony on the grounds of an error concerning the torpid behavior 
of the woman, which, according to the common evaluation of men, af-
fects the very person and thus make this person completely different. 
Judge Parisella qualifies this assertion as being completely false (est ve-
hementer erroneum tarn in iure, quam in facto), and he clarifies the con-
cept of error redundans: It is not a case of an error of quality which in it-
self renders the matrimony invalid, but rather of an error of quality which 
redounds in error of the person. This occurs when the quality is princi-
pally intended while the person is intended less principally 8 4. 
8 3 . «Iamvero, qualitas redundat in personam quando ipsa prae persona intenditur, idest 
quando subiectum contrahens intendit matrimonium inire cum persona determinata per 
aliquam qualitatem, adeo ut non velit connubium inire cum quacumque persona neque cum 
persona cognita utpote praedita quadam qualitate, sed tantummodo cum persona quatenus et in 
quantum babente illam vel illas qualitates. Igitur attendi debet ad rationem sub qua 
contrahens compartem cognoverit necnon ad intentionem qua cum ilia contrahere voluerit», 
c. POMPEDDA, July 2 8 , 1 9 8 0 , n. 6 . 
8 4 . «...quippe ignoraverit corruptos mulieris conventae mores; atque proinde erraverit 
circa qualitatem personae non incidentalem seu secundariam, sed redundantem in personam: 
'qualitas meretricis est determinativa personae, iuxta communem existimationem'. Huius-
modi autem assertum, quidquid egregius actoris Patronus opinatur, est vehementer erroneum 
tarn in iure, quam in facto. Ad ius quod attinet, praeter ea quae fusiore calamo supra 
exposuimus, abs re admonere non erit errorem circa qualitatem tunc tantum irritum reddere 
matrimonium in duplici casu de quibus in § 2 eiusdem canonis 1 0 8 3 ; ageretur enim de casu, 
quo error qualitatis redundaret, id est refunderetur in errorem personae. Quod tantummodo 
contingere solet, quoties 'directe et principaliter intenditur qualitas et minus principaliter 
persona' ( S . ALPHONSUS)», C. PARISELLA, June 1 6 , 1 9 8 3 , n. 5 5 in fine and n. 5 6 . 
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2. A shift of focus from the quality to the consent 
The increasing acceptance of the third Alphonsian rule in Rotal ju-
risprudence responded to the greater stress and importance given to mat-
rimonial consent and to the object of this consent. Gaudium et Spes n. 48 
and canons 1055 § 1 and 1057 § 2 now emphasize the fact that this 
consent is the origin of the matrimonial bond. Through this consent, the 
spouses mutually receive and give themselves to one another, not only for 
purposes of the ius in corpus but also to establish a consortium totius vi-
tae. It is not surprising, therefore, to encounter the center of attention 
turning towards the will of the contractant. In fact, it is completely logical 
and coherent with this new focus on the essence of matrimony as defined 
by Vatican U and received into the new code; that is, matrimonial consent 
includes much more than the ius in corpus, but also encompasses the con-
sortium totius vitae. As a result, in the measure that Rotal jurisprudence 
began accepting a quality principally and directly intended as a valid 
grounds of nullity (and sounding the arguments and basis for this nullity), 
it became more apparent that the basis of this juridical figure pointed not 
so much to the quality isolatedly considered but more so to the very mat-
rimonial consent of one of the spouses. Thus, a clear shift in focus begins 
to develop: a shift away from the quality and towards the consent or will 
of the contracting party. 
As an example, Judge Pompedda, while still maintaining (at least in 
theory) the objective importance of the quality according to the common 
feeling or estimation of today's civil and ecclesiastical societies, stresses 
the fact that a redounding quality is that which ought to be included 
among the aims of the will or the object of consent 8 5 . If this is the case, 
that the quality becomes part of the object of matrimonial consent, then 
when the quality is lacking the very consent is vitiated. To support this 
notion, Pompedda invokes St. Thomas. 
The angelic doctor reasons that whatever impedes the cause, by its 
very nature, must also impede the effect. Since consent is the cause of 
matrimony, that which invalidates the consent also invalidates the matri-
85 . «Reduci iam debet ad redundantiam illam definite intellegendam: res igitur compo-
ni iterum iterumque debet intra fines voluntatis seu consensus obiectum», c. POMPEDDA, July 
23, 1980, n. 6. 
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mony. Consent is an act of the will which presupposes an act of the intel-
lect. If the first aspect is lacking or deficient, then necessarily the second 
part is also defective. Therefore, when an error impedes the understand-
ing, it follows that the consent is defective as well, and as a consequence 
the matrimony too. Thus, error invalidates matrimony by natural l aw 8 6 . 
The reasoning is quite clear and logical, and other auditors began moving 
in the same direction. 
Judge Serrano in 1982, after speaking about the need to consider an 
error as regards the quality of a person from the perspectives of fraud, er-
ror and condition, maintains that these figures should be considered from 
the aspect of conjugal consent which is an act of the will necessary for the 
mutual exchange of the persons marrying 8 7 . 
In 1984, Judge Stankiewicz, who seems to have captured the essence 
of the third Alphonsian rule, maintains that error of a quality principally 
and directly intended falsifies the mutual self-giving and acceptance of 
he spouses. In his opinion, Rotal jurisprudence holds that the truer 
explanation of canon 1083 § 2, n. 1 of the 1917 code, concerning 
error of a quality redounding in error of the person, is that the quality 
is intended before the person. This occurs when the consent is brought 
to bear directly and principally on the quality and indirectly on the 
person. Then the quality, being an integral part of the contractant 
(personam compartis integrans ), invades the object of consent which 
includes the mutual self-giving and acceptance of the contractant 8 8 . 
86 . «Denique tandem succurrit lucidissima Aquinatis doctrina: 'quidquid impedit causam 
de sui natura, impedit et effectum similiter. Consensus autem est causa matrimonii. Et ideo 
quod evacuat consensum, evacuai matrimonium. Consensus autem voluntatis est actus, qui 
praesupponit actum intellectus. Deficiente autem primo, necesse est defectum contingere in 
secundo. Et ideo, quando error cognitionem impedit, sequitur etiam in ipso consensu 
defectus. Et per consequens in matrimonio. Et sic error de iure naturali habet quod evacuet 
matrimonium' (Supplem., 1. 51, art. 1, in c)», c. PoMPEDDA, July 23, 1980, n. 6, in fine. 
This same text of St. Thomas is cited by Agustoni in the sentence of July 10, 1984, n. 12. 
87 . «Et haec omnia, cum piene recognoscantur valida etiam sub sola consideratione 
consensus coniugalis tamquam actus voluntatis, quo perficitur necessaria ilia, de qua diceba-
tur, mutua ipsarum personarum nubentium commutatio», c. SERRANO, May .28, 1982, n. 17. 
88 . «Quapropter etiam penes N. Fori prudentiam nunc verior habetur can. 1083, § 2, n. 
1 C.I.C. a. 1917 explanatio, iuxta quam error qualitatis in errorem personae redundat, si 
qualitas prae persona intendatur, quod obvenit quotiescumque consensus fertur directe et 
principaliter in qualitatem, indirecte autem in personam. Tunc enim qualitas personam 
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Stankiewicz maintains the same idea in a sentence of December, 
1985 8 9 . 
In a decision of June 24, 1987, Judge Palestre maintains the same 
line of thought A quality principally and directly intended is contained in 
the very matrimonial consent. Hence, if the desired quality is lacking, 
then the consent is deficient as well 9 0 . 
A decision in 1987 by Judge Huot moves in the same direction. The 
sentence states that, exceptionally, the object of matrimonial consent may 
include not only the physical person of the partner, but a person necessar-
ily adorned with a definite quality. These qualities, if intended directly and 
principally, penetrate into -and constitute- the object of consent; thus, an 
error concerning a quality redounds in the very person 9 1 . Later, the po-
nens is even more explicit in his explanation of the manner in which the 
desired quality affects the will. His opinion is that the quality substitutes 
the person. As a result, if one errs concerning this quality, the object of 
the contract no longer exists. The auditor refers to works by Fumagalli-
Carulli and Di Felice in order to support his view. These authors maintain 
that the prevalent object of the consent is the quality, and that the will or 
mind of the contractant is directed towards and falls upon the physical 
person in as much as this person possesses the desired quality 9 2 . 
compartis integrans, in obiectum consensus, in quod cadit contrahentis sui ipsius traditio et 
alterius acceptatio ingreditur», c. STANKIEWICZ, January 2 4 , 1 9 8 4 , n. 7 . 
8 9 . «Sane qualitas directe et principaliter intenta, in aestimatione errantis personam 
compartis identificans, in obiectum consensus, in quod cadit sui ipsius traditio et alterius 
acceptatio, ingreditur», c. STANKIEWICZ, December 1 9 , 1 9 8 5 , n. 1 4 in fine. 
9 0 . «Et hoc explicatur quia contrahens suum consensum directe et principaliter ad 
qualitates personae dirigit et tantum indirecte et subordinate ad personam, quare in consensu 
haec qualitas continetur et, dificiente reapse qualitate, deficit consensus», c. PALESTRO, June 
2 4 , 1 9 8 7 , n. 6 , in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» ( 1 9 8 8 ) 2 , pp. 3 - 1 3 . 
9 1 . «Objectum vero contractus matrimonialis exceptionaliter esse potest non ipsa 
solummodo persona physica compartis sed persona determinata qualitate (vel determinatis 
qualitatibus) necessario ornata; quae qualitas autem, si directe et principaliter intenditur, 
objectum ingreditur et constituit, error circa qualitatem tunc in ipsam personam redundat», c. 
H U O T , November 2 4 , 1 9 8 7 , n. 1 5 , in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» ( 1 9 8 8 ) 4 , pp. 4 6 2 - 4 7 4 . 
9 2 . «In mente errantis qualitas substituit personam: si errat, objectum contractus non 
amplius existit. Hoc enim verificatur 'cuando il nubente valuta quella qualità come più 
importante della persona fisica dello stesso consorte e perciò sostituisce il tipo di persona 
corrispondente a quella qualità astratta alla persona fisica, dirigendo verso questa qualità la 
sua volontà' (O. FUMAGALLI-CARULLI, in // matrimonio canonico dopo il Concilio, p. 6 4 ) . 
Tali in casu, 'il consenso espresso dal contraente ha per oggetto prevalente quella qualità, 
ritenuta esistente in quella persona e, mancando l'oggetto del consenso, il consenso stesso 
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Agustoni expresses a similar opinion concerning a qualifying quality 
which becomes a requirement of the matrimony and penetrates the voli-
tional act. (This is much more than mere simple error.) He makes a com-
parison with this juridical figure and those of simulation and exclusion of 
the essential ends of matrimony maintaining that in all of these juridical 
figures, one is in the area of a defect of consent because the aim of the 
will is lacking or wrong 9 3 . 
A recent decision by Judge Faltin simply states that the case of error 
concerning a quality is a problem of lack of consent 9 4 . 
Now that Roman jurisprudence acknowledged the vitiating strength 
of an error of quality to reside in the will of the contractant, other discus-
sions arose concerning the type of will necessary to void a matrimony. In 
other words, to what «degree» must the quality form part of the will? Or, 
what type of will is necessary to consider that a quality was principally 
and directly intended? Some Rotal judges took up this question, and their 
observations are discussed in the following section. 
3 . Is a positive act of the will necessary for marital consent to be vi-
tiated? 
Judge Pompedda has used the term numquam satis to describe the in-
vestigation concerning the defect of consent resulting from a quality prin-
cipally intended 9 5. 
non ha valore giuridico' ( A . DlFEUCE, La recente giurisprudenza rotale circa Verror qualitatis 
redundans in errorem personae., in Dilexit justitiam, p. 4 3 » , c. H U O T , November 2 4 , 1 9 8 7 , 
n. 3 3 , in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» ( 1 9 8 8 ) 4 , pp. 4 6 4 - 4 7 4 . 
9 3 . «Manet certo solvenda, singulis in casibus, ardua quaestio an intenta sit in facto 
'qualitas qualificanda' in personam redundans: verumtamen in iure iam clarum est, quod agi 
debet de requisito quod consensum ingressum sit, ideoque, simplicem errorem exploserit ... 
»Quae illic referuntur praesertim ad exclusionem bonorum essentialium coniuga et ad 
simulationem consensus spectant, sed congrue congrua relatis, legitime tribui possunt etiam 
consensui ex errore praestito: in utroque namque casu agitur de consensu qui in proprium 
obiectum tendit detortum», c. AGUSTONI, July 1 0 , 1 9 8 4 , n. 1 3 . 
9 4 . «Probationem vero quod respicit, sicuti in omnibus causis defectus consensus, ita 
etiam in huiuscemodi causis ob errorem qualitatis redundantem in errorem personae...», c. 
FALTIN, May 2 6 , 1 9 8 9 , n. 1 1 , in «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 ( 1 9 9 0 ) , pp. 1 7 7 - 1 9 0 . 
9 5 . Cfr. c. POMPEDDA, July 2 8 , 1 9 8 0 , n. 3 . 
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It seems clear that the Rotal jurisprudence now puts the invalidating 
force of an error of quality principally and directly intended in the matri-
monial consent. The matrimonial will formulated and emitted by one of 
the contractants contains an element (the quality) which is lacking in the 
other party; this causes the consent to be vitiated in its root, and therefore 
the marriage is null and void. 
However, the question arises: when does the quality become so 
linked to the matrimonial consent as to completely vitiate this act of the 
will, making it null in its very origin? Is it necessary to demonstrate a 
positive act of the will? Must it be expressed or may it be implicit? Several 
of the sentences studied address this question. 
Judge Faltin, in his decision of 1989, dedicates a fair amount of the 
in iure to this problem. The decision maintains that canon 1097 § 2 in-
cludes two possibilities which can be described in the following manner: 
1) in as much as a quality is subjectively principally and directly intended 
in an express manner; 2) a quality which is principally and directly 
intended objectively by the society and subjectively by the contractant but 
in an implicit manner 9 6 . The ponens continues explaining this distinction 
using an argument very similar to one already commented. 
Because of the culture and traditions of a given society, certain quali-
ties may be directly and principally intended by the contractant but in an 
implicit manner. This implicit desire or will has its measure in the 
«objective» desire or will of the society. In other words, if the society as a 
whole, because of a general way of thinking, principally and directly 
«intends» a specific quality in matrimony, it can be presupposed that the 
individual also intends -directly and principally- this quality. It has already 
been pointed out that this manner of proceeding is difficult to put into 
practice in a coherent and consistent manner. 
However, what is more interesting here is the mention of an implicit 
act of the will. The ponens maintains that this type of will is sufficient to 
nullify a marriage supporting this affirmation in a passage originally ap-
96 . «Certo certius, in citato canone duo hypotheses incluendae sunt, scilicet: a) quate-
nus expresse, directe et principaliter subiective intendatur; et b) quatenus qualitas directe et 
principaliter obiective a societate et a contrahente subiective, sed Implicite vehementer 
directe et principaliter intendatur», c. FALTIN, May 26, 1989, n. 9, «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 (1990), 
pp. 177-190. 
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pearing in a decision by Sabattani and later cited by Palestro. Faltin also 
makes reference to a decision by Pompedda in 1985. The three auditors 
maintain that an implicit act of the will is sufficient in order to acknowl-
edge an error of a quality which redounds in the person. 
The reasoning of Judges Faltin and Palestro, using the words of 
Sabattani, is that an implicit act of the will remains in the positive order, 
and although the substance of this intention is not immediately obvious, it 
is truly and positively contained in the consent and not merely presumably 
contained therein 9 7. 
Given that, in the opinion of some judges, an implicit act of the will 
has a nullifying effect, Faltin is quick to point out that one should not con-
fuse a quality which is implicitly but directly and principally intended with 
a quality presumably directly and principally intended 9 8 . In any case, 
Faltin mentions that one should keep in mind the subjective evaluation of 
the quality by the contractant. Once again, a greater forcefulness is given 
to the subjective aspect or to the will of the contractant in which the qual-
ity of the partner becomes the radical identifying factor. According to 
Faltin, the lack of consent brought about by this pre-determination and di-
recting of the will towards a certain quality is extremely difficult to distin-
guish from a moral or psychological incapacity of giving consent to a per-
son who lacks this quality 9 9 . 
As has been mentioned, Judge Palestro also supports the idea that an 
error of quality principally intended can be acknowledged with an implicit 
97 . «Ratio est, quia 'actus implicitus remanet in ordine posit ive quatenus quamvis 
eius substantia non appareat directe et immediate in manifestatione consensus agentis, ta-
men ibidem identidem continetur realiter et non praesumptive, positive et non interpre-
tative' (cf. R.R. D e c , in uno Caracen., diei 24 iunii a. 1987, c. P A L E S T R O , n. 6; in una 
Neapolitana, diei 22 iulii a. 1985, c. POMPEDDA, n. 15)», c. FALTIN, May 26, 1989, n. 9 in 
fine, in «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 (1990), pp. 177-190. 
This same text is cited by Doran in his decree which confirms Judge Faltin's sentence. 
Cfr. decree c. D O R A N , November 9, 1989, n. 9 in fine, in «Monitor Ecclesiastic\is» 116 
(1991), pp. 379-389. 
9 8 . Cfr. c. FALTIN, May 26, 1989, n. 10, in «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 (1990), pp. 177-190. 
9 9 . «Utcumque et in omni casu attendi debet ad aestimationem subiectivam contra-
hentis, in quo qualitas compartis identificans personam tarn radicatam adesse et veluti incar-
natam adeo ut defectus consensus difficilime distingui possit ab incapacitate morali seu 
psychologica aliter cogitandi,...», c. FALTIN, May 26, 1989, n. 10, in «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 
(1990), pp. 177-190. It does not seem that the judge is using «incapacity» with all of its 
juridical connotations as it is used in canon 1095. 
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act of the will. Besides the text already cited, he bases his argument on an 
instruction from 1877 which declares that an indirect and implicit intention 
is sufficient to prove a lack of marital consent 1 0 0 . Palestro continues his 
reasoning citing a text from a decision by Pompedda where he claims that 
a quality directly and principally intended can be included in a general and 
implicit act of the will. Therefore a positive act of the will is not neces-
s a r y 1 0 1 . 
Although Judge Pompedda seems to be generally pleased with the 
new canon 1097, he does offer some criticism in his decision of 1985. 
One of the aspects which he comments concerns the necessity of a posi-
tive act of the will. In the opinion of this Roman auditor, one can deduce 
from canon 1101 § 2 , in the contrary sense, that a positive act of the will 
is not needed to consider a quality as principally and directly desired by 
the contractant 1 0 2 . The reasoning seems to be that if a positive act of the 
will is needed to exclude an essential part of the matrimonial alliance, then 
everything else which might pertain to the will can be considered as 
falling beneath the influence of an implicit or general intention. In other 
100. «Ut qualitas directe et principaliter intendatur non requin tur actus explicitus cum 
sufficiat actus implicitus, quod confirmatu etiam ex argumento contrario cum S.C.S. Officii 
in Instructione ad Episcopum nesuquilien d. 24 januarii 1877 declaraverit sufficere inten-
tionem indirectam et implicitam ad comprobandam pravam voluntatem non consentiendi in 
vinculum perpetuum (cfr. Fontes C.J.C., vol. IV, n. 1050, p. 373)», c. PALESTRO. June 24, 
1987, n. 6, in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1988) 2, pp. 3-13. 
101 . «In praecitata sententia diei 22 iulii a. 1985 c. Pompedda, Pon. affirmatur 
'quamvis id violentiam in sensum canonis interpretandum (agitur de can. 1097, § 2) 
aliquando sapiat, illa directa et principalis intentio in qualitatem, circa quam nubentes errant, 
generali et implicita ratione intelligi posse, atque ideo non positiva volúntate'», c. 
PALESTRO. June 24, 1987, n. 6, in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1988) 2, pp. 3-13. 
Pompedda concedes that this interpretation seems to «Stretch» the canon a bit. 
It would seem there is a bit of contradiction here. Previously, Judge Palestro cited a 
passage which maintains that an implicit act of the will or intention remains in the positive 
order, while here, Judge Pompedda's assertion seems to consider an implicit intention as 
being opposed to a positive intention. 
102. «Res utique plerumque erit quaestio facti, sed potior atque doctrinalis quaestio erit 
de mera significatione subiectiva an potius de ratione obiectiva agnoscenda illi intentioni 
directae et principali. Priorem interpretationem nimis festinanter atque fortasse nimia levi-
tate accepisse videntur quidam Auetores de novo Codice disserentes. Intentio sane, cum sit 
voluntatis directio, quid subiectivum formaliter dicit, haud tarnen requirit positivum et expli-
citum actum: quod confirmatur, ex argumento contrario, ex eo quo nisi adsit positivus actus 
exclusionis (can. 1101 § 2) ad valide contrahendum matrimonium, idest ad obligationes 
suscipiendas sufficit generalis intentio contrahendi*, c. POMPEDDA, July 22, 1985, n. 15. 
ERROR OF QUALITY IN RECENT ROTAL JURISPRUDENCE 269 
words, according to this line of thought, a positive act of the will is 
needed to exclude an essential part of matrimony, but an implicit act of the 
will is sufficient to include a non-essential aspect in the matrimonial con-
sent. 
Lastly, simply to mention a sentence of 1973 by Judge Ewers, the 
auditor described the will of the contractant as not only principally aimed 
at the quality but also directly and exclusively directed towards this 
quality 1 0 3 . The ponens immediately afterwards quotes the words of Judge 
Bejan concerning a quality which is substantially intended and not merely 
accidentally. What is noteworthy here is the use of the adverb 
«exclusively» to describe the matrimonial will's tendency towards the 
qual i ty 1 0 4 . 
4. Observations concerning the act of the will in a quality directly 
and principally intended 
The previous section presents the opinions of various Rotal judges 
who maintain that an implicit will is sufficient to consider a quality as be-
ing principally and directly intended. Judge Pompedda seems to have 
been the first to speak about the nullifying capacity of an implicit will; 
later Palestro took up the same idea, and finally Faltin reiterates this the-
ory. Faltin, though, would seem to be stricter in his understanding of an 
implicit will since he speaks about a moral or psychological impossibility 
of contracting with a person who does not have the greatly desired qual-
ity. Pompedda admits that this interpretation smacks of doing violence to 
the meaning of the canon. His observation is well taken, and therefore 
some comment should be made concerning this issue. 
First, it would seem that the decision or discernment concerning 
whether or not a quality is implicitly desired reverts back to an old prob-
lem: more often than not, this implicit desire has its roots in the social or 
traditional customs of the place where the matrimony is celebrated. Once 
103. Cfr. c. EWERS, February 10, 1973, n. 3. 
104. It would seem the use of «exclusively» is rather strong since this would imply the 
exclusion of all the other properties and elements of matrimony, in which case, there would 
be no matrimonial consent. The fact that the auditor later quotes Bejan would seem to 
indicate that he is in favor of, or at lest agrees with, the idea that the will be substantially 
directed towards the quality and not exclusively. 
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again, judges would be faced with the difficult task of deciding or 
«making a list» of those qualities which every person in this particular 
society implicitly but directly and principally desire in their partner. Both 
Pompedda and Palestro base this implicit desire on these apparently ob-
jective social factors 1 0 5 . It has already been seen that this is not easily ac-
complished. There would always be qualities which are greatly desired 
but cannot be considered as always directly but implicitly intended. In 
addition, the contractant's volitional act could be contrary to what is gen-
erally esteemed by society. This would lead to many grey areas, uncertain 
qualities, which would open the way for many fissures in the matrimonial 
bond. 
Even if one concedes that certain qualities are always implicitly but 
directly intended, other problems arise. For instance, if it were acknowl-
edged that every person in a given society implicitly but directly and prin-
cipally desired a certain quality in the other (for example, an academic title 
or a certain nationality), lacking this quality would become a type of im-
plicit impediment. That is, persons who do not enjoy these qualities 
would be impeded in contracting matrimony if they did not make this fact 
known to the other partner; and moreover, the marriage would be null 
even if the other contractant did not, in fact, directly and principally desire 
this lacking quality. Granted, the Church does have the power to enact 
such laws, but it would seem very risky attempting to define exactly what 
qualities of the person should be included. It would be virtually impossi-
ble to make a universal law which could be applied in the whole 
w o r l d 1 0 6 . 
105. Pompedda, immediately after stating that a positive act of the will is not 
necessary, supports his position precisely in these social or cultural factors. «Ita quosdam 
apud populos, uti fori usus nos docuit, haud intelligitur ex parte viri puella nubilis idest 
matrimonio apta quae non sit virgo, aut quae ad generandum non sit capax; item apud 
quasdam familias vel in quibusdam coetibus nulla mulier in matrimonium traditur nisi cum 
viro certis qualitatibus sive nobilitatis sive census sive socialibus praedito. Numquid ibidem 
agnosci debet, si error exstet circa qualitates easdem, consensus nullus?», c. POMPEDDA, July 
22, 1985, n. 15. 
106. Of course, this does not go against what the Church has legislated concerning 
other qualities (such as age, public honesty or disparity of cults). Since these qualities 
directly affect the essence of matrimony or relate to the substance of the matrimonial bond, 
the legislator considers them impediments to a valid marriage. One could argue, therefore, 
that in the same way, the legislator could raise socially important aspects or greatly desired 
qualities to the category of an impediment, at least implicitly. Perhaps. But although the 
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Thus, the very basis for determining which qualities are implicitly 
desired by all persons seems to be a bit risky. One is thrust once again 
into the area of criteria which are decided by a group of people, and then 
applied to individuals in contracting a particular matrimony. Moreover, 
these qualities are not essential in themselves to matrimony. Giving them 
an implicit nullifying force, then, would be to raise non essential elements 
to the level of implicit impediments, and thus bring with it a correspond-
ing restriction in the ius connubii. 
Palestro and Pompedda both give other reasons for accepting their 
opinion. Palestro based himself on an old instruction which maintained 
that an implicit and indirect intention is sufficient to prove a lack of will in 
consenting to a perpetual bond. 
Pompedda, to prove his manner of thinking, invokes precisely canon 
1101 § 2. He seems to conclude that since a positive act of the will is nec-
essary in order to exclude an essential element of matrimony or an essen-
tial property of the same, then an implicit act of the will is sufficient to in-
clude other non-essential properties or non-substantial qualities concern-
ing the person. However, it seems this argument could be turned around. 
In other words, if a positive act of the will is necessary to exclude an es-
sential part of matrimony, then a positive act of the will is also necessary 
to raise a non-essential quality to the level of an indispensable requirement 
of the matrimonial alliance 1 0 7 . 
With this way of thinking, one takes for granted as included in a 
matrimonial will or consent only those aspects which are essential to the 
decision to do this may be correct (most of the time or in most cases), the reasons are wrong. 
While all the other impediments are derived from looking at the essence of the matrimonial 
alliance, and afterwards throwing out all those aspects which directly or indirectly go 
against this bond, these «implicit impediments* begin by looking at what the society 
thinks and then applying these criteria to matrimony. The logic is backwards and could 
easily lead to a degeneration of the true definition of matrimony. 
107. One might argue that subjectively including as essential an objectively (from the 
point of view of natural law) non-essential quality is not true matrimonial consent. Here one 
is faced with two possibilities. 1) Disallow altogether this possibility of including non-
essential elements as part of the matrimonial consent by not acknowledging these qualities 
directly intended and considering the consent valid. This is the position of classical 
canonical doctrine. 2) Consider such consent as not being true matrimonial consent, and 
therefore, null by definition. 
This work proposes that both of these arguments are rejected by the legislator's 
acceptance of canon 1097 § 2. 
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matrimonial alliance. Any other non-essential quality or aspect would 
have to be included by a positive act of the will and not by a mere implicit 
act. It would seem that if one is to assume that a matrimonial will is valid 
and contains all the «essentials» unless there is a direct act of exclusion of 
one of these elements, then it is logical that one assumes no «extras» to be 
added to this consent unless it too is done by a positive act of the will. 
St. Alphonsus' example, when describing his third rule, seems also 
to push in this direction. The statement «1 wish to marry a noblewoman». 
directly expresses an act of the will concerning a quality. St. Thomas, in 
his example, speaks of someone who «directly intends to consent in mar-
riage to the son of a king». Again, it would seem here that a positive and 
deliberate act of the will is warranted. The problem which one encounters 
in studying real-life causes is that the majority of the contractants do not 
openly express this desire or intention. Thus, some auditors looked to an 
implicit act of the will as a solution. Besides the fact that the foundation of 
the implicit act is insecure, the very definition of an implicit act of the will 
does not really indicate to what degree this implicit act directly affects or 
invades the marital consent. 
Taking all these things into account, this study proposes a distinct 
point of view of the problem as presented in other recent Rotal jurispru-
dence: the point of view of the consent, and concretely, the essential ele-
ments or objects of this consent. Therefore, if a certain quality is raised to 
an essential element of the consent, and this quality is lacking, the consent 
is invalid. The main point here is that the quality becomes an essential 
component of the matrimonial will (and not merely an integral part) such 
that the consent does not exist without this quality. 
This manner of presenting the problem avoids the discussion of an 
implicit act of the will. What is important to judge is if there was another 
aspect added to the basic content of the matrimonial alliance and if this as-
pect was considered essential to the matrimony by the contractant. In the 
example of St. Alphonsus, nobility becomes an essential aspect of matri-
mony. The person may or may not expressly think or will: «1 want to 
marry a nobleperson», but other words or deeds will demonstrate that the 
contractant considered nobility an essential requirement in his/her matri-
mony. Judge Agustoni puts it very well and succinctly when he states that 
a quality directly and principally intended binds the validity of the con-
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tract, for it becomes part of the very substance of the consent 1 0 8 . Judge 
Huot states that the quality invades the substance of the contract to the 
point that if the quality is lacking then the object of consent is absent as 
well, and therefore, the consent is deficient 1 0 9. 
Conceiving an error of a quality principally and directly intended in 
this manner puts all the nullifying power in the will of the contracting 
p a r t y 1 1 0 . The advantages of this solution could be summarized as fol-
lows: 1) It reinforces, once again, the fundamental importance of the will 
as the origin and source of the matrimonial bond; 2) it also reinforces the 
classical doctrine that an accidental quality in itself, as important as it may 
seem to some, does not enjoy nullifying strength against the matrimonial 
bond; 3) at the same time, it avoids the problems and dangers of an inco-
herent and chaotic matrimonial system based on the values of a given so-
ciety and traditions of certain cultures; 4) it helps maintain the objective 
reality and perspective of natural law when dealing with matrimonial im-
pediments. 
E. Proving a quality principally and directly intended 
This section deals with an interesting aspect of the present study since 
it descends to real life situations and presents the arguments and evidence 
which Rotal judges used in acknowledging nullity on the grounds of a 
quality principally and directly intended. Studying the in facto part of the 
Rotal decisions will help to better understand this juridical figure in its di-
verse aspects and also its manner of application to particular marriages. Of 
course, especially useful and interesting are those causes which actually 
granted the nullity on the grounds of an error of quality principally and di-
tos. «... qualitatem directe et praevalenter intendit ipsi nectit validitatem contractus, 
quia illa haeret substantiae consensus», c. AGUSTONI, July 10, 1984, n. 14. 
109 . «Qualitas ipsam contractus substantiam ingrediuntur atque constituunt ac proinde, 
deficientibus illis, deficit objectum contractus; deficiente autem objecto, deficit et ipse 
consensus», c. H U O T , November 24, 1987, n. 46, in «II Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1988) 4, pp. 
4 6 2 - 4 7 4 . 
110. In his commentary to canon 1097, Viladrich describes the error as forming «un 
todo único con su consentimiento, esto es, pasa al consentimiento por un acto de voluntad 
no interpretativa, sino actual». P.J. V I L A D R I C H , Comentarios al Código de Derecho 
Canónico, Pamplona 1987, p. 660. 
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rectly intended, although sentences which decided in favor of the bond 
will be studied as well. 
Since the Alphonsian interpretation of a quality principally and di-
rectly intended moves in the area of consent, it is obvious that the most 
common form of evidence will be indirect. In other words, judges will 
have to more closely consider the contractant's behaviour and reactions 
upon discovering the error than his/her testimony 1 1 1 . 
1. Sentences which did not grant the nullity 
Proving that a quality was not directly or prevalently intended is 
usually an easier task than proving the contrary. For instance, in the deci-
sion c. Pinto of November 12, 1973, although the ponens follows the 
Sanchonian interpretation, he does accept the third rule of St. Alphonsus 
as an implicit condition. Therefore, in the in facto part of the cause, he ar-
gues that there is no evidence which supports the claim that the plaintiff 
desired a certain quality in his spouse. The quality discussed here is lack 
of fecundity, and the plaintiff himself holds that sterility does not render 
the matrimony null. It is also noted that the plaintiff continued living 
peacefully with his spouse for 19 years after discovering her sterility. 
This strongly suggests the man could not have greatly or principally de-
sired this quali ty 1 1 2 . 
In another decision by Pompedda on July 23, 1980, a man married a 
woman (already pregnant) and accuses his marriage on the grounds of er-
ror concerning her honesty and virginity. The verdict given was in favor 
of the bond because 1) Venceslaus, the plaintiff, knew his wife was preg-
nant when they began matrimonial life, and 2) the cause of the separation 
came about because Venceslaus' mother and sister pressured him to sepa-
rate; it was not really his decision 1 1 3 . Again, the behaviour and actions of 
the plaintiff are used as indicators to acknowledge or not the presence of 
an error of quality prevalently intended. 
111 . Cfr. c. FALTIN, May 26, 1989, n. 11 (entire), in «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 (1990), pp. 
177-190 . 
112. Cfr. c. PINTO, November 12, 1973, n. 13. 
113. Cfr. c. POMPEDDA, July 23, 1980, nn. 9-11. 
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In a decision handed down by Judge Parisella on June 16, 1983, the 
actor claimed he suffered an error concerning the good moral customs of 
his wife. However, the actions of the plaintiff undermine this argument as 
the parish Pastor testifies that the husband was the more anxious about the 
reconciliation of his marriage. The sentence frankly states that the cause of 
the separation was the tension between the wife and the older children 1 1 4 . 
When the previous sentence was appealed, Judge Jarawan also de-
cided in favor of the bond. This Rotal auditor again looks to the behavior 
and the words of the husband. The plaintiff openly states that he married 
Livia, the respondent, because she was a laborious and affectionate 
woman. In addition, after the separation, the woman declares that the 
plaintiff would visit her practically everyday asking her to return to his 
h o m e 1 1 5 . 
Another sentence by Judge Stankiewicz employs the same method: 
the actions of the plaintiff deny that he really principally and directly in-
tended a certain quality in his wife. The cause deals with a man who mar-
ried an epileptic woman. Even though the plaintiff accused the marriage 
because of error concerning the health of his spouse, the acts demonstrate 
that it was very unlikely the plaintiff knew nothing about the epilepsy. In 
any case, the marriage continued from 1972 to 1979, during which time 
the wife's condition was evident. The husband even admits that he was 
hoping his wife would get better and that he gave her all the help he 
could 1 1 6 . It seems clear that the husband never considered ending marital 
life because of his wife's sickness. On the contrary, his first reaction is 
one of help and hope for improvement. 
Judge Stankiewicz, in a decision of December 19, 1985, also recurs 
to the behavior of the plaintiff before the matrimony and after the error is 
discovered. Based on these events, Stankiewicz overturns a previous 
Rotal decision which granted the nullity on the grounds of e r ror 1 1 7 . The 
cause deals with a woman who became enamored with a man because of 
his religious spirit and sacrifice in living the Gospel, especially with re-
114. Cfr. c. PARISELLA, June 16, 1983, nn. 58 and 59 in fine. 
115. Cfr. c. JARAWAN, December 18, 1984, n. 4 and n. 5 in fine. 
116. Cfr. c. STANKIEWICZ, January 24, 1984, nn. 2, 13. 
117. Stankiewicz rejects the grounds of error, but does grant the nullity under a different 
chapter (the incapacity of the respondent to assume the obligations of matrimony). 
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gard to helping the poor. After the matrimony, the husband completely 
changes, giving himself over to a materialistic life-style, and eventually, 
he was taken away by the police because of unpaid debts. 
Citing a passage from the appealed sentence, Stankiewicz esteems 
that Mary, the plaintiff, did not seem to have a pre-conceived notion of the 
man she wanted to marry; it appears that she fell in love with Titus be-
cause of his spiritual qualities, but not that she specifically and directly 
desired them before the matrimony 1 1 8 . 
Moreover, the judge points out that the woman did not err concerning 
the respondent's qualities at the time of the marriage, but rather there was 
a radical change in his character. According to this turnus, Titus had gen-
uine desires of serving the poor but his lack of expertise and a naive char-
acter seemed to have led to his ru in 1 1 9 . Here, Stankiewicz makes an inter-
esting distinction: the difference between an error of the person and a 
change in the character of the person 1 2 0 ; this difference is especially im-
portant when dealing with moral qualities. 
In addition, Stankiewicz indicates that married life lasted for five 
years, during which the plaintiff had plenty of time to discover her er-
r o r 1 2 1 . It should also be remembered that Mary asked for an annulment 
only after Titus was condemned in Civil court in order to recuperate her 
liberty in front of the Church 1 2 2 . Thus the sentence, based on these ac-
118. «Attamen intentio actricis nubendi viro complexu qualitatum humanarum et 
religiosarum ornato, quas igitur directe et principaliter intendere debuisset, ex testibus 
nullum ducit argumentum. 
»Hoc enim clare admittit appellata sententia quod scilicet: 'summa qualitatum ab actrice 
in convento desideratarum et suppositarum minus constare poterit ex testibus'», c. 
STANKIEWICZ, December 19, 1985, n. 19. 
119. «Intentio Titi ad ducendam societatem 'di imbianchini' in bonum indigentium, 
pauperum et sic denique revera recta erat, sed malitia aliorum nec non ipsius conventi impe-
ritia vel prorsus incapacitas ad similia negotia gerenda una cum nimia credulitate in ceteros, 
ipsum ad ruinam seu decoctionem perduxit», c. STANKIEWICZ, December 19, 1985, n. 19. 
120. «Nullus igitur error in actrice de qualitate personae viri conventi tempore 
nuptiarum oriri poterat, etiamsi ob mutationem animi humani et propter circums tanti as 
nuptias subséquentes conventus se immutaverit, quin tarnen hoc intenderit ante matrimonium 
partium», c. STANKIEWICZ, December 19, 1985, n. 19. 
121 . «Ceterum serio admitti nequit affirmatio de perduratione erroris in actrice per 
quinque annos vitae coniugalis, tamquam si mulier a viro derelicta percipere potuisset 'di 
aver sbagliato persona'», c. STANKIEWICZ, December 19, 1985, n. 19. 
122. Cfr. c. STANKIEWICZ, December 19, 1989, nn. 2-3. 
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tions of the plaintiff, does not grant the nullity on the grounds of an error 
of quality redounding in the person. 
Other decisions which do not grant the nullity because of error in-
clude the following: c. Pompedda, July 22, 1985; c. De Lanversin, 
March 20, 1985; and a decree of Masala on March 25, 1986 1 2 3 . Like all 
the previous sentences cited, they base much of their evidence on the 
plaintiffs actions upon discovering the error concerning the allegedly de-
sired quality. Others prove, at the same time, that the plaintiff never fell 
into error. However, the common characteristic in all of these sentences is 
the lack of evidence before the marriage to support the plaintiff in his/her 
claim that the quality was principally and directly intended. That is, there 
is no proof of the will being predetermined as regards a particular quality. 
2. Sentences which did grant the nullity 
Judge Pompedda handed down a decision on July 28, 1980 which 
acknowledged the nullity of a matrimony for an error of a quality directly 
and principally intended. The sentence points out that the matrimony took 
place immediately after Victor, the husband, declared that he had a spe-
cific university degree as well as a good and well-paying j o b 1 2 4 . The wit-
nesses also confirm that Patricia, the plaintiff, held these qualities in high-
est esteem and that she was willing to marry only a man endowed with 
these desired qualit ies 1 2 5 . 
That Patricia had a clear preconceived notion concerning the qualities 
of her future husband, and in fact greatly desired these traits, is clear from 
her reaction and behavior upon discovering that her husband did not enjoy 
these qualities. The plaintiff considered her marriage null precisely after 
having found out that her husband lied about his work and the scholastic 
degrees. It is worth noting that matrimony life lasted three years, and 
123. This decree appears in «lus Canonicum» 28 (1988), pp. 637-639. 
124. Cfr. c. POMPEDDA, July 28, 1980, n. 16. 
125. «Testes una voce confirmant nedum aestimationem maximam illorum qualitatem 
conventi ex parte mulieris, sed insuper istius consilium praenuptiale nubendi tantummodo 
viro iisdem qualitatibus praedito... 
»Anuntiata, actricis affinis deponit: 'Patrizia mi riferì a suo tempo di esseri innamorata 
di Vitorio perchè di ottime qualità'», c. POMPEDDA, July 28, 1980, nn. 16 and 17. 
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Patricia considered her matrimony null only after discovering the truth 
about her husband. The sentence uses this reaction as evidence of the high 
esteem and great importance which Patricia gave to these qualities. The 
husband describes Patricia's reaction as «scioccante» and he himself con-
fesses that his wife's aspiration had always been to marry a man socially 
well-situated. The husband continues saying that having learned the truth, 
she went to the priest asking for the annulment of her mat r imony 1 2 6 . 
Other witnesses confirm that Patricia regarded her matrimony null at the 
moment she learned about the true situation of her husband 1 2 7 . 
In this decision of 1980, Pompedda advocated the double require-
ment for error redundans. Therefore, he also demonstrates that the quali-
ties about which Patricia erred are aspects which affect the very substance 
of the person, and therefore void matrimonial consent. The argument or 
evidence concerning the importance of the qualities, as has been men-
tioned earlier, lacks force. It seems a matter of simply claiming the qual-
ity's importance 1 2 8 . Moreover, this argument would seem to be superflu-
ous since the nullifying power of a quality principally and directly 
intended arises from a lack of consent, not because the person is 
different 1 2 9 . 
126. «Quantum momentum habuerint in animo et aestimatione actricis qualitates con-
venti, veluti laurea doctoralis, officium inceptum et curriculum emetiendum, prae ceteris ipse 
vir etsi nolens demonstravit ubi rettulit: 'Quando mia moglie venne a conoscenza di questi 
fatti, la sua prima reazione fue scioccante... dopo lo choc iniziale, l'azione di mia moglie è 
stata più cosciente, perchè si rese veramente conto della gravità della situazione che si era 
creata, a causa del mio comportamento precedente... quella situazione costituiva il crollo di 
quello che, evidentemente, era stato sempre la sua aspirazione e cioè di aver un marito 
socialmente molto elevato... Faccio notare che Patrizia, al momento della mia reale 
situazione, aveva detto a D. Ottavio, me presente, che avrebbe chiesto l'annullamento del 
matrimonio'», c. POMPEDDA, July 28, 1980, n. 12. 
127. Cfr. c. POMPEDDA, July 28, 1980, nn. 12 and 17. 
128. «...certo certius qualitates et conditiones personales viri conventi iam obiective 
maximi ponderis sunt faciendae, eo potissimum si spectentur conexae et influxum substan-
tialem exercentes in vitam coniugalem. Neque quispiam ambigere valet titulum academicum, 
munus exercitum, curriculum officii, denique capacitatem suo aere providendi sibimet atque 
condendae familiae constituere in communi hominum aestimatione huius potissimum tem-
poris qualitates personales seu rem maximi ponderis, adeo ut deficientibus illis potissimum 
si cunctae simul persona alia habeatur penes hominum societatem pariter ac penes singulos 
homines», c. POMPEDDA, July 28, 1980, n. 14. 
129. If the jurisprudence were to accept and use this concept of objectively important 
qualities, it would now be processed under canon 1097 § 1 (error of the person) and not under 
1097 § 2. Fumagalli would seem to agree with this. Cfr. O. FUMAGALLI, Persona e società nel 
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In a cause which arrived to the hands of Judge Stankiewicz, the po-
nens declared a matrimony null because of an error concerning the 
woman's fertility. The sentence spends a fair amount of time speaking 
about the customs of the people emphasizing the special regard and high 
esteem which large families enjoy in that particular culture. This impor-
tance becomes even more striking when one considers, as is mentioned in 
the sentence, that the African Episcopal Conference suggested that the 
Church consider sterility a diriment impediment in this region. The 
reasons given by the Episcopal Conference for this request center around 
the strong social and cultural customs of the people. They see matrimony 
not so much as a contract between two individuals but as an alliance or 
bond between two families (and the entire family). In addition, the 
husband and wife are not really considered as such until the day of their 
f irstborn 1 3 0 . 
It is obvious that fertility is an important characteristic for this soci-
ety. However, the sentence does not consider this as sufficient to prove 
the quality was principally and directly intended, but rather, it judges the 
actions, behavior and deportment of the plaintiff upon discovering the er-
ror. Of course, beliefs of his culture will form a part (and even a big part) 
of his desires for matrimony, but the concrete case must be judged on its 
own merits taking into account the persons involved. This is exacüy what 
the sentence does. 
After speaking about the importance of fertility for this particular 
culture, the sentence presents a testimony of the man to prove his marital 
intention was bound to the possibility of having children 1 3 1 . 
The decision also investigates the plaintiffs actions ki order to prove 
that he really principally and directly intended to marry a woman who 
matrimonio canonico con particolare referimento all'error facti, in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» 
(1981) 2, pp. 184-185. 
130 . Cfr. c. STANKIEWICZ, February 24, 1983, n. 8. These were the recommendations 
and conclusions from the 1981 meeting of the African and Madagascar Episcopal Conferen-
ce. Stankiewicz's source is F.J. URRITA, Pastoralis matrimonialis et familiaris in Africa VI 
Congresus Generalis SECAM in «Periodica de re morali canonica liturgica» 71 (1982), p. 259. 
131 . «Moi, je voulais -ait- une personne avec qui partager la vie dans l'amour sans 
hypocrisie. Je voulais une personne avec qui j'aurais des enfants, avec qui je partagerais la 
noble tâche d'éducation des enfants pour leur donner une meilleure éducation chrétienne et 
civique», c. STANKIEWICZ, February 15, 1980, n. 9 infine. 
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could bear children. The man, having consummated the matrimony, 
became aware of the operation which his wife underwent. Immediately 
he asks her about the operation and if it might be a cause of sterility. 
He considered this an essential aspect for the validity of his 
marr iage 1 3 2 . 
Afterwards the plaintiff demanded that his wife take a medical test in 
order to prove her fitness to have children, but she refused 1 3 3 . He then 
obtains a civil separation, convinced of having been defrauded by his 
w i f e 1 3 4 . It is clear that the actions and behavior of the man readily 
demonstrate his error concerning a quality which he prevalently and di-
rectly intended. The fact that fecundity is held in high esteem in his culture 
is strong evidence that the plaintiff might have really desired this quality, 
but the evidence must prove that this man, in this particular matrimony, 
really desired this specific quality. 
Judge Agustoni, on July 10, 1984, declared a matrimony null be-
cause of an error concerning an hereditary mental illness in the respon-
dent. The decision points out the actions of Joseph, the plaintiff, before 
the matrimony. Concretely, he twice decided against marrying because his 
prospective future wife seemed not to enjoy perfect mental hea l th 1 3 5 . 
132. «.. . 'devait être pour toi une cause de stérilité, alors nous voulons engendrer?'; et 
tune haec verba adiecit: 'et si nous en arrivons chez le médecin et qu'il trove que ça ne va pas 
bien, nous n'aurons pas été mariés (validement)'... 
»Haec autem verba luculenter probant actorem voluisse valorem sui matrimonii pendere 
ab exsistentia qualitatis mulieris capacitatem ad procreationem respicientis», c. 
STANKIEWICZ, February 24, 1983, n. 12. 
133 . «Quin etiam actor firmiter expostulabat a muliere ut examen radiographicum 
subiret ad probandam suam aptitudinem ad prolis generationem, sed frustra: 'Elle y est allée 
et a vu le docteur S., mais elle n'a pas terminé les examens, quisqu'elle n'est pas passé à la 
radiographie'», c. STANKIEWICZ, February 24, 1983, n. 12. 
134 . «Tandem actor pro persuaso habens se fuisse in errorem inductum a parte con venta 
circa eius fecunditatem, sive seprationem instituit, sive ad obtinendum civile divortium 
recurrit ut agnosceretur 'qu'il n'y a pas eu de vrai mariage'. 
»Id autem fecit, ut ait, 'pour qu'on voie clairement de quel côté se trouve la vérité'», c. 
STANKIEWICZ, February 24, 1983, n. 12. 
135. «Bis etenim Ioannes Maria nuptiis ineundis cum optimis mulieribus restitit, qua 
qualitate, idest integra salute, plurimi aestimata, carebant. Idque habendum est ampia 
demonstratio quod actor matrimonio ipso perfectam valetudinem compartis praeferebat, non 
voluntate quadam generali, sed actuali», c. A G U S T O N I , July 10, 1984, n. 17. Cfr. as well n. 7 
and n. 1. 
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After meeting Helen and considering marriage, Joseph wrote letters to 
Helen's father specifically asking about the psychological health of his 
future spouse 1 3 6 . 
When Helen's illness becomes apparent, and the plaintiff is certain of 
its hereditary origin, he immediately requests the null i ty 1 3 7 . The sentence 
also points out why the actor delayed his accusation of the matrimony 
(They were married in 1955, and Joseph asked for the nullity in 1967). 
First, he was not sure about the true origin of Helen's sickness because 
both her father and mother obfuscated the truth; second, he had been 
away a long time for military service; and third, he did not know that this 
chapter of nullity existed 1 3 8 . 
As is clearly evident, the behavior of the plaintiff before the wedding 
was extremely important to prove an error of quality directly and 
principally intended; and even more important was the reaction of the 
plaintiff after discovering that the respondent lacked the greatly desired 
quality. 
Judge Huot, on November 24, 1987, decided in favor of the nullity 
because of error as regards a moral quality; he, like the previous auditor, 
bases his decision on the actions of the plaintiff before the wedding and 
after discovering the error. 
Citing Irma's (the plaintiff) words, the judge shows she greatly de-
sired a traditional family with many children; Irma had previously rejected 
other young men because they did not share these same idea l s 1 3 9 . The 
1 3 6 . «'La vérité entière: elle seule peut me permettre de faire cesser une indétermination 
dont je sais le mal qu'elle fait à Eliane'. Nisi perfecta sanitate fruebatur, Ioannes Maria 
dilectissimam Helianam deserere decreverat, sicut iam ante acciderat pro aliis mulieribus», c. 
AGUSTONI, July 1 0 , 1 9 8 4 , n. 1 7 
1 3 7 . Cfr. c. AGUSTONI, July 1 0 , 1 9 8 4 , n. 1. 
1 3 8 . «Ratio dein agendi actoris apprime congruit cum suis adsumptis. Causam enim 
serius promovit quia ignorabat validum motivum: 'Si j'ai tant attendu, c'est que je n'ai eu 
connaissance de cette cause qu'en août 1 9 6 6 ' ... e mente praeterea ne excidat quod nefastus 
influxus marris Helianae, quae pariter ac filia psychicis afficiebatur perturbationibus fucum 
fecit ventati, ita ut difficulter natura vera infirmitatis conventae dignosceretur», c. 
AGUSTONI, July 1 0 , 1 9 8 4 , n. 1 7 . Cfr. as well n. 1 and n. 9 . 
1 3 9 . «Suam ante nuptialem intentionem aperte exponit actrix: 'Questo mio progetto, 
che per me era essenziale ed irrenunciabile, ha sempre occupato la mia attenzione e 
constituiva il vertice delle mie aspirazioni'... Plures exinde jam respuerat juvenes, qui 
talibus essentialibus qualitatibus non gaudebant», c. HUOT, November 24, 1987, n. 37 in 
fine, in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1988)4, pp. 462-474. 
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judge considers this as a strong indicator that Irma really directly desired 
these qualities as part of her matrimonial wi l l 1 4 0 . 
Earlier in the sentence, the ponens reasoned: «if one first and fore-
most wants to create a Christian family with children, and one chooses a 
man apt for this purpose, then the contractant does not principally and di-
rectly intend this man, but rather a man adorned with these qualities. The 
intention therefore is primarily and principally brought to bear on a 
Christian family as an end and on an adequate man as a means to this end, 
or better yet, on the qualities necessary to obtain this end* 1 4 1 . 
Upon marrying, however, Irma discovers that Robert, the respon-
dent, did not possess these qualities in the least bit. Moreover, he was 
given over to a dissolute life and depraved customs. In addition, he 
showed himself unwilling to have children 1 4 2 . 
Thus the auditor, basing himself on the testimony and actions of the 
plaintiff, acknowledged an error of quality principally and directly in-
tended which affected the very substance or object of the matrimonial 
contract 1 4 3 . 
Judge Faltin's decision was already discussed in the previous chapter 
concerning an implicitly, but directly and principally intended quality. As 
was seen, the ponens of this sentence maintains that the beliefs of society 
or culture can play such an important part in the marriage contract that a 
quality may be considered as always being implicitly but directly 
140. «Si jam alii viri, propter desideratarum qualitatum absentiam, repulsi an tea fuerunt, 
hoc manifestât maximum momentum seu pondus qualitatum in mente puellae, quae principa-
liter vult qualitates in viro ad finem prosequendum: normalem ergo intimitatem sexualem», 
c. H U O T , November 24, 1987, n. 33 in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1984)4, pp. 462-474. 
141 . «Si quis autem primo et principaliter vult creationem familiae christianae cum 
prole et virum ad hoc aptum elegit, non hune virum directe et principaliter sed virum his 
qualitatibus ditatum intendit. Intentio primo et principaliter fertur in familiam christianam 
tanquam finem et in virum aptum tanquam medium ad finem vel potius in qualitates ad hunc 
finem obtinendum necessarias», c. H U O T , November 24, 1987, n. 33, in «Il Diritto 
Ecclesiastico» (1988)4, pp. 462-474. Cfr. as well n. 39. 
142. Cfr. c. H U O T , November 24, 1987, n. 41 in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1988) 4, 
pp. 412-474. 
143 . It may be argued that the proof concerning the plaintiffs intention of the qualities 
desired, although clear for the turnus, does not have the same force as in other sentences 
studied. This is probably due to the nature of the qualities desired (generation of children and 
a normal matrimonial life) which in themselves affect the essence of matrimony. 
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intended. In this sentence, the aspect concerns virginity. The ponens 
proves virginity is a greatly desired trait in the society from statements 
such as: «the girl ought to be a virgin» or «according to our culture, the 
good character of the girl is proved by her virginity* 1 4 4 . 
Despite this importance which the society or culture may attribute to 
virginity, the majority of the proof of a quality principally and directly in-
tended is manifested by the plaintiffs actions and by looking at the con-
crete facts of the cause 1 4 5 . The plaintiff himself testifies that virginity was 
fundamental for him, to such a point that he would not be disposed to take 
her as his wife 1 4 6 , and his actions clearly demonstrate this attitude. 
Things went bad from the very first night of the honeymoon when 
the man discovered his wife was not a virgin. A very turbulent matrimo-
nial life ensued which lasted only six months, after which time the 
spouses separated. At the insistence of the plaintiffs family, he and his 
partner reunited. However, the plaintiff, being so obsessed that his part-
ner lacked the desired quality, badgered her to the point that she tried to 
commit suicide. They broke again after one month 1 4 7 . 
The respondent herself admits that the man was completely discon-
certed and upset after the first night, and that the following day he alerted 
his spouse's sister and his own family to ask about her honesty 1 4 8 . 
As is plainly evident, Faltin puts a good deal of emphasis on the 
customs of the people. The fact that virginity is considered -in general- as 
a necessary prerequisite for marriage by this society weighs heavily in ac-
knowledging a quality directly and principally intended. It should be 
noted, however, that in presenting his argument for nullity, the ponens 
144. «Etenim, iuxte innator mores, radicatas traditiones atque perennem culturam popu-
li ceylonensis, uti deduci potest ex confessione partium in causa atque ex declarationibus 
omnium testium, '... la ragazza deve essere vergine al momento del matrimonio'. Immo, ipsa 
conventa candida confessa est: 'Secondo la nostra cultura, il buon carattere della ragazza è 
provato dalla sua verginità'-», c. FALTIN, May 26, 1989, n. 15, in «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 (1990), 
pp. 177-190. 
145. «In casu contractu, de quo hinc agitur, ex actis et probatis omni cum certitudine 
eruitur, qualitatem illam obiectivam, etiam subiective et expresse a viro, in contrahendo 
matrimonio, intentam fuisse», c. FALTIN, May 26, 1989, n. 15 «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 (1990), pp. 
177-190 . 
146. Cfr. c. FALTIN, May 26, 1989, n. 15, in «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 (1990), pp. 177-190. 
147. Cfr. c. FALTIN, May 26, 1989, n.l, in «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 (1990), pp. 177-190. 
148. Cfr. c. FALTIN, May 26, 1989, n. 16 in «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 (1990), pp. 177-190. 
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puts more stress on the subjective estimation of the quality. All the 
evidence centers around the fact that the one contracting, in this 
matrimony, could not accept a non-virgin for a w i f e 1 4 9 . The customs 
surrounding this matrimony are helpful in proving that a quality might be 
directly intended, but what must be proved is that it was in fact directly 
intended. The decision follows the route of proving a quality directly and 
expressly (through actions) intended. The distinction made earlier 
concerning a quality impliciUy (because of the customs and traditions of a 
certain society), but directly, intended does not seem to be used. The 
majority of the evidence concerns this man and his behavior in this 
particular matrimony. Once again, the criteria of the subjective aspect 
receives greater attention. 
II. ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS CONCERNING CANON 1097 § 2 
(«ERROR REDUNDANS»«ERROR CAUSAM DANS», AND 
RETROACnVITY) 
A. « Error causam dans» and an error of quality directly and principally 
intended 
1. The difference in theory 
Canon 1097 § 2 states that «Error concerning a quality of a person, 
even if such error is the cause of the contract, does not invalidate matri-
149. «Nihilominus, qualitas virginitatis in sponsa a viro non era suposita, sed 
simpliciter, iuxta suae gentis mores atque culturam, necessario praerequisita, ideoque directe 
ac principaliter intenta. Aliis verbis, id quod hinc interest, est actoris subiectiva rei 
aestimatio, de qua autem ambigendum non est, quod eruitur ex suo modo agendi statim ac 
detexerit, rudis et incultus cum sit, puellam virginem non fuisse. 
«Tandem, ne repetamus ea quae supra iam retulimus, sufficiat hinc pauca facta atque cir-
cumstantias quasdam afferre, quae coroborant thesim actorem, veluti: a) iam prima nuptiarum 
nocte 'macanza di sangue sconvolse definitivamente Giovanni'; b) ille defectus sanguinis 
fu la ragione delle loro continue liti'; c) ob hanc rationem, ipse evitò qualsiasi tipo di 
conversazione con me e cominciò anche a bere'; d) post tres vel quattor dies ipse petiit di 
portarla via»; e) post separationem temporaneam unius hebdomadae, conventa, instantibus 
viri parentibus, rediit in domum mariti, sed 'il vecchio problema' permansit, quod 'problema 
lo spinse ad interrogarla continuamente'; f) exinde vita communis pro confuit '...un inferno 
in terra», adeo ut ipsa et suicidium attentavit et ita porro'», c. FALTIN, May 26, 1989, n. 18 
and n. 19, in «Ius Ecclesiae» 2 (1990), pp. 177-190. 
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mony unless this quality was directly and principally intended. «Like its 
predecessor of the 1917 code, this canon denies nullifying strength to an 
error which is merely the cause of contracting marriage. Since error 
causam dans does not ruin matrimonial consent, but an error of a quality 
directly intended does impede consent, it is not only useful -but essential-
to clearly distinguish these two concepts 1 5 0 . 
In the 1917 code, error causam dans by itself had no nullifying effect 
upon the matrimonial bond, and this prohibition was respected by the 
jurisprudence when the figure of a quality principally and directly 
intended was introduced. In other words, Rotal jurisprudence, even 
before the new code, distinguished these two figures. This difference is 
clearly marked by a sentence c. Mannucci on June 20, 1 9 3 2 1 5 1 . The 
ponens states that there was no error of an accidental quality which 
redounded in the person, but only an error which was the cause of the 
contract. The definition which the judge uses for a redounding error is 
that of a quality principally and directly intended. So, even as early as 
1932, the jurisprudence distinguished these two figures 1 5 2 . 
In 1969, Bejan also seems to differentiate when a quality is the cause 
of the contract and when a quality is principally intended. The ponens 
notes that the quality desired by the plaintiff, even if it were the cause of 
the contract, does not render the marriage invalid. He continues in the 
next paragraph speaking about qualities principally intended. (Although, it 
is true that the ponens considers this figure a type of condition sine qua 
non)153. 
1 5 0 . Örsy mentions the difficulty which sometimes arises in distinguishing the two 
figures. Cfr. L. Ö R S Y , Marriage in Canon Law. Texts and Comments. Reflections and 
Questions, Wilmington (Delaware) 1 9 8 8 , pp. 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 . 
1 5 1 . Although this decision does not form part of those which are properly the object 
of this study, it is useful to see that a clear distinction was made very early on in Rotal 
jurisprudence. 
1 5 2 . «Nec pariter constat de errore qualitatis accidentalis redundantem in personam ... 
Adfuit ergo error, dans causam contractui: sed minime probatur error qualitatis redundans in 
errorem personae. Non probatur, quod haec qualitas asserta ingressa sit directe, principaliter, 
praecisive in consensum matrimonialem, eum definiendo seu positive limitando», c. 
MANNUCCI , June 2 0 , 1 9 3 2 , n. 7 . 
1 5 3 . «Deceptus quidem fuit vir in sua spe, sed error, etsi dederit causam contractui, cum 
destitutus sit qualitatibus a iure requisitis, invalidum non reddit matrimonium. 
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Judge Canals, in describing the less strict interpretation, cites Giacchi 
immediately after speaking about St. Alphonsus' third rule. The Italian 
professor makes the distinction thus: 
«In the case of error causam dans, excluded by canon 1083 § 2 as a motive 
of nullity, the contractant principally intends to marry the other person 
even though this decision is made only because he assumes the existence of a 
quality, without which, the contractant would not have married. In the case of 
error redundans, (in the sense of St. Alphonsus' third rule) the contractant 
wishes to marry, in a certain sense, the desired quality -that is, an abstract 
type of person who is made up from the abstraction of that quality. (For 
example, 'the virgin', the 'noble', the 'musician', 'the diplomat', 'the 
American', e t c , ) » 1 5 4 . 
Here a clear distinction is made between a quality which causes one 
to contract matrimony and a quality which is desired as a fundamental and 
essential part of the matrimonial bond. The difference between the two 
concepts should be evident given Giacchi's explanation and the definition 
of an error of quality principally and directly intended. 
In the case of error causam dans, as Giacchi points out, one is im-
pelled to contract marriage because of a given quality of his/her partner. 
While it is true that the contractant would not have married had he/she 
known the desired quality to be absent, what the contractant did really 
desire or will, at that moment, was to marry. 
Several authors make this distinction. Bañares, for one, clearly illus-
trates this point. The erroneous will pushed to marry because of an error 
causam dans, really «willed» matrimony. After discovering the error, the 
person manifests what he/she would have wanted in a given situation, but 
»Etiamsi admittere valimus actorem principaliter voluisse has qualitates in sponsa, tunc 
tantum error circa has qualitates irritat matrimonium, quando positae sunt sub forma 
conditionis sine qua non, de qua statim», c. BEJAN, July 16 1969, n. 12 in fine. 
154. «Id sic explicat Giacchi: "Nel caso dell' error causam dans, escluso dal can. 1083 
§2 come motivo di nullità, il nubente intende in via principale sposare l'altro contraente, 
anche se a questa decisione è venuto soltanto perché suppone nell'altro soggetto una qualità 
senza la quale non lo sposerebbe; mentre nel caso dell' error redundans il nubente voule 
sposare, per così dire, la qualità considerata e cioè, a dir meglio, un astratto tipo di persona 
che è costituita dalla astrazione di quella qualità (ad esempio 'la vergine', il 'nobile', il 
'musicista', 'il diplomatico', 'l'americano', ecc.)" (// consenso nel matrimonio canonico, 
1968, p. 73)», c. C A N A L S , Aprii 20, 1970, n. 2. 
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not what he/she really did will. Here, one is dealing with a mere interpre-
tative will, which as is known, does not affect what one desired in 
actu155. 
Typical expressions which indicate an error which is the cause of the 
contract include the following: «If I had known...», «He/she would not 
have married if it wasn't for (a certain quality)...*, «The only reason the 
marriage took place was because he/she thought he/she was...». 
However, these types of statements manifest more clearly what the con-
tracting spouse did will at the moment of the matrimony. The «1 do» was 
an «1 do» without hitches. The contractant married because of the quality, 
but the fact is that he/she really married. There was a true and simple 
matrimonial will. 
Following Giacchi's distinction, one sees that an error of a quality 
principally and directly intended is even stronger or more demanding than 
error causam dans. The «1 do» -the consent- is objectively bound to a 
desired quality which the contracting party believes the other to possess. 
In this case, the will actually includes this quality in the matrimonial 
consent. As Giacchi says, one wants to marry -in a certain sense- the 
quality embodied in the person 1 5 6 . It is not a matter of what the person 
would have willed or done if he/she had known..., but rather, what the 
person did will at the moment of the matrimony. The fundamental 
difference is twofold: 1) the predetermination or previous binding of 
he will to a certain quality and 2) this predetermination invades the 
155. «Resulta aquí de nuevo fundamental comprender en concreto la diferencia entre el 
conocer, y el querer actual. (Although the author is dealing with error concerning the 
properties of matrimony, the same observations are valid for the topic here treated.) En efec-
to si se tratase de un error antecedente o causam dans, ello no significaría que el consen-
timiento fuese nulo. Es cierto como ya vimos, que el error causam dans es aquél que es causa 
motiva del acto jurídico, en el sentido de que, de haberse conocido, no hubiera sido puesto 
por el sujeto. Pero esto mismo reafirma lo expuesto antes: pues tal error sólo indica 'lo que la 
voluntad habría querido en un supuesto determinado', pero no lo que realmente quiso; se trata 
de una simple 'voluntad interpretativa', que no prueba nada de la voluntad real in actu-». J.I. 
BAÑARES, El errar y la ignorancia en el consentimiento matrimonial. Pamplona, 1988, («pro 
manuscripto»). 
156. The words «in a certain sense» are important. As is obvious one does not marry 
the quality, but the person. Only the person, with all of his/her qualities, is the object of 
matrimonial consent. 
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very matrimonial consent including the quality as part of the object of 
consent. 
2. The confusion in fact 
Although certainly distinguished in the 1917 code, and clear in the-
ory, the difference between error causam dans and an error principally 
intended becomes, at times, blurry in the praxis. In some cases, it would 
seem that an error of quality principally and directly intended is present, 
but the evidence given only supports error causam dans. In others it is the 
opposite; one encounters an error which is the cause of the contract, but 
the decision considers there was an error of a quality directly intended. 
Di Felice's decision of March 26, 1977, once again, serves as a use-
ful example for the present issue. As was seen, this cause declares a mar-
riage null because the plaintiff thought her husband was a doctor. The 
ponens seems to be clearly in favor of the third Alphonsian rule as an 
invalidating factor. He cites the previously mentioned texts of Mannucci 
and Heard where these sentences favorably present the Alphonsian 
interpretation. 
Certainly, there is evidence to confirm that the quality of a doctor was 
directly intended, however it is mixed with evidence which demonstrates 
that the quality was the cause of contracting. This probably stems from 
the fact that the sentence speaks about an error which redounds in the per-
son being at the same time an error causam dans. Taking as an example 
canon 1083 § 2, 2° which concerns slavery, the sentence reasons that 
there may be other errors with respect to similar qualities of the person, 
being the cause of the contract, which are able to invalidate the marriage 
(with the condition that the error redound in error of the pe r son ) 1 5 7 . 
157. «Quod explicitis verbis canon statuere debuerit, dum potius peculiaris determinatio 
erroris quoad qualitatem servitutis, implicite, demonstrat etiam alios errores quoad aequales 
personae, causam dantes contractui, invalidare matrimonium posse, dummodo redundent in 
errorem personae», c. Di FELICE, March 26, 1977, n. 4. It should be kept in mind that this 
affirmation is before the advent of the new code. 
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Given this consideration, the sentence classifies Mary's error in terms of 
the cause of the contract 1 5 8 . 
Throughout the in facto part of the sentence, there is a certain mixture 
of evidence which in some cases indicates an error of quality principally 
and directly intended, while in other cases, it indicates an error which is 
merely the cause of the marriage. Therefore, one encounters arguments 
similar to the following: «The plaintiff wished to marry a doctor more 
than Charles» (the respondent). This statement clearly demonstrates a 
quality principally and directly intended; the quality of a doctor was de-
sired more than the person. Nevertheless, the evidence which follows de-
notes an error which was the cause of the contract and a mere interpreta-
tive will. «If she had known he was not a doctor, she would not have 
married him. So, error of the quality, intended by the will of the plaintiff 
in selecting a spouse for matrimony, redounds in the p e r s o n » 1 5 9 . 
Especially common are statements like: «1 would not have married him 
had I known he was not a doctor.» «The fact the plaintiff thought the re-
spondent was a doctor is what led to the marriage» 1 6 0 . Without a careful 
reading of this decision and not having a clear distinction between error 
causam dans and an error of quality principally intended, this sentence 
could give the impression that an error which is the cause of the contract 
is sufficient to void a matrimony. 
Other judges, following the line of an error of quality principally and 
directly intended, clearly distinguish this concept from an error which is 
the cause of the contract. The sentence by Agustoni on July 10, 1984 is 
158. «Qui error causam matrimonio dedit, cum Adelanna [Mary] artem medici magni 
faceret et animo nubere prorsus medico quam Carolo Edmundo exoptaret, . . .», c. Di FELICE, 
March 26, 1977, n. 8. 
159. «Subiective autem error qualitatis in casu quam maxime obtinet, cum actrix potius 
medico quam Carolo Edmundo nubere voluerit. Immo, si scivisset eum medicum non esse, 
illa matrimonium haud contraxisset. Error qualitatis ergo, etiam voluntate actricis in 
seligendo sponso ad nuptias faciendas attenta, redundat in errorem personae,...», c. Dì 
FELICE, March 26, 1977, n. 10 in fine 
160. «Io certamente sapevo che era medico. Se fossi stata a conoscenza della realta dei 
fatti, e cioè che Carlo non era medico, sono convinta che non l'avrei sposato». «Verum 
igitur asserit actrix in praesenti causa, cum affirmet se errore qualitas medicae artis consenti 
tantummodo inductum fuisse ad matrimonium cum eo contrahendum...», c. Dì FELICI, March 
16, 1977, n. 8 and n. 9 respectively. 
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especially interesting since it highlights this difference in both the in iure 
and in facto parts of the sentence 1 6 1 . 
The in facto part of the cause states that the crux of the problem is not 
a matter of considering the error as a false judgement about something, or 
that it was the cause of the contract, but rather, one must determine in 
what manner the object of the error affected the consent 1 6 2 . At the same 
time, the sentence is a bit critical of the first instance decision because it 
concedes error causam dans but does not continue its reasoning to speak 
about other types of error which have a juridical impact. The ponens is in 
agreement that an error which is the cause of the contract has no juridical 
effect, but -the sentence continues- one must investigate the object of the 
error and how it may influence the validity of the bond. He continues 
speaking precisely about the difference between error causam dans and an 
error which affects the substance of matrimonial consent 1 6 3 . 
The most interesting and critical part of the sentence, though, is when 
the ponens proves the quality (lack of hereditary mental illness) was di-
rectly intended and not merely the cause of the marriage. Agustoni argues 
that the words «If I had not obtained the guaranties, I would not have 
continued* cannot be understood as an interpretive will. It is not the same 
to say, «If I had not known» and «If I had not obtained the guaranties,*. 
This second expression clearly denotes a positive act of the will. The 
plaintiff obtained proofs -guaranties- concerning his wife's mental health. 
He took positive steps to assure the desired quality existed in his spouse. 
(For example, the letter to her father, as referred to previously). Agustoni 
161. This cause has an interesting Rotal history: c. Ferraro, December 9, 1975, pro 
vinculo; c. Raad, June 22, 1978, pro vinculo; the present sentence, pro nullitate for error; c. 
Dl F E L I C E , June 22, 1985, confirms the previous sentence. None of the other decisions have 
been published in the S R R D . 
162. «Non enim primo et principaliter error considerandus erat utpote falsae rei 
apprehensio vel causa contractus, sed attendendum erat obiectum errorris, scilicet qualitas 
quae consensum, ex quo coniugium fit, afficit», c. A G U S T O N I , July 10, 1984, n. 15 in fine. 
163. «Cum vero lex statuat nullum esse declarandum matrimonium quoque ex errore 
initum, dummodo error cadat super qualitatem in personam redundantem, in foro externo iam 
non est instandum, num error causam dederit contractui, sed potius quaenam fuerit qualitas, 
seu obiectum erroris relate ad substantiam foederis nuptialis», c. A G U S T O N I , July 10, 1984, 
n. 16 in fine. 
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indicates that these words (of course, combined with the actions they 
imply) are totally different from saying, «If I had known», a phrase 
which does not prove the matrimonial will having been bound to the 
qual i ty 1 6 4 . 
Thus, Agustoni bases his evidence on a careful and discerning inter-
pretation of the plaintiffs testimony, and he explicitly addresses the dif-
ference between an error of quality direcdy intended and an error which is 
the cause of the contract. 
A decision by Judge Colagiovanni in 1983 declared a matrimony null 
for error but was later overturned because it seemed to confuse (or fuse) 
the two types of error being discussed. The in iure part of the sentence 
contains arguments which appear to support an error of quality principally 
intended, at the same time though, there are other arguments which (while 
trying to illustrate the Alphonsian concept) support or describe error cau-
sam dans instead. The ponens first speaks about an error which is not 
only the motive for the contract, but constitutes an essential part of the 
matrimonial alliance. This is an error of quality principally and directly 
intended 1 6 5 . 
In the following number, though, he cites a text from Pompedda 
which describes error causam dans, not an error of a quality principally 
intended. Colagiovanni's argument, based on an earlier decision by 
Pompedda, is that an error which causes the matrimony to be celebrated is 
164 . «Primo enim ait: 'Si je n'avais pas obtenu de garanties, je n'aurais pas donné de 
suite'; Nosque obiter adnotamus quod loquutio testis nequit intellegi pro volúntate interpre-
tativa. Idem non est dicere 'si j'avais su' ac 'si je n'avais pas obtenu des garanties'; quia hic 
alter modus dicendi dénotât actum voluntatis positivum. Et prosequitur: 'Ces renseignements 
m'ont donné confiance'. 'Je pensais être totalement rassuré'. 'Autant que je puisse juger à 
l'heure actuelle, si j'avais appris au moment du mariage ou peu avant qu'il y avait dans la 
parentée d'Elaine des anomalies psychiques, à plus forte raison des tares mentales 
héréditaires, j'aurais rompu'», c. AGUSTONI, July 10, 1984, n. 17. This last sentence seems 
to fall more squarely in the area of error causam dans. 
165. «Qui error... "scolpendo il soggetto ed inerendo strettamente ad esso, non solo 
motiva, ma altresì concorre essenzialmente al processo formativo dell'atto umano (in 
genere, in quanto tale e, in specie, in quanto matrimoniale) e ne costituisce l'oggetto o, 
quanto meno,una componente essenziale" [A.C.. JEMOLO, // matrimonio, Torino, 1961, p. 
124; COLANTONIO, Error qualitatis redundans in errorem personae. Monitor Ecclesiasticus, JJ 
(1983) pp. 202-203]». C. COLAGIOVANNI, November 22, 1983, n. 15. 
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sufficient to invalidate the same if this quality, because of its importance, 
makes the other person very special. This is Canals' theory combined 
with error causam dans 1 6 6 
Later, Colagiovanni cites an author who considers the motive which 
drives the will as the central point of the volitional act. The ponens, there-
fore, seems to consider the motives for contracting as important in the 
matrimonial will. As a result, the conclusion is that error causam dans vi-
tiates the matrimony when the quality about which there is error is objec-
tively important 1 6 7 . 
The in facto part of the cause, as is logical, offers evidence which de-
notes error causam dans, not an error of a quality principally intended. 
The girl fell in love with Titus because of his qualities, not because she 
specifically looked for a person with these characteristics 1 6 8. 
In the appeal of this sentence, Judge Stankiewicz rejects the grounds 
of error. His fundamental reason is that there was no error concerning 
Titus' qualities, but rather a change in his character 1 6 9 . Nevertheless, 
what is of interest here is that Stankiewicz makes a clear and direct dis-
tinction between the two figures170. Citing the words of Fumagalli, Stan-
kiewicz claims that an error which is the cause of the contract cannot void 
the matrimony since this type of error is merely an abnormal element in 
the intellect. The intellect, it is true, supplies the will with erroneous in-
166. «Hinc est quod tertia regula alphonsoniana, cui facile remittit nova renovati Codi-
cis norma (can. 1097, § 2), praevalens facta est penes N.S.F. iurisprudentiam iuxta quam si 
probetur eatenus quis contraxerit, 'quatenus in comparte qualitatem aliquam erronee putat 
exstare adeo ut certo non contraheret si non adesset' (causam Pompedda, diei 25 novembris 
1978), dummodo talis qualitas vel summa qualitatem 'personam faciat peculiarissimam' et 
qua talis per matrimonium appetatur, si deficiat, aliam personam faciat cui consensus 
praestitus non fuit», c. COLAGIOVANNI, November 22, 1983, n. 16. 
167. «Scribit G.: "Il punto centrale dell'atto volitivo è dato dall'influenza dei motivi 
che sollecitano la volontà ad autodeterminarsi per la realizzazione di un fine...; motivo 
dell'atto volitivo è tutto ciò che si presenta all'individuo come un valore da raggiungersi che 
si presenta come un bene nei rispetti dell'individuo" (Introduzione alla psicologia, «Vita e 
Pensiero», II ed., pp. 286-287)», c. COLAGIOVANNI, November 22, 1983, n. 18. 
168. Cfr. c. COLAGIOVANNI, November 22, 1983, n. 20. 
169. This aspect was already discussed. 
170. «Sed error, qui dicitur 'redundans', vel in qualitate personae directe et principaliter 
intenta, (note fusion of terms) confundi nequit cum simplici errore qualitatis vel dante 
causam contractui», c. STANKIEWICZ, December 19, 1985, n. 15. 
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formation, but this error does not enter into the object of the volitional 
a c t 1 7 1 . 
The ponens continues arguing that whether the error be antecedent or 
concomitant, the consent (in these cases) is still brought to bear directly 
on the person and indirectly on the quality, even though this quality be the 
motive of the contract. Taking examples from St. Alphonsus, this type of 
error is manifested in phrases such as the following: «1 wish to marry 
Ticia, whom I think is a noblewoman*, or, one already seen, «If I had 
known the error, I would not have contracted marriage* 1 7 2 . 
3. Reason for the confusion 
Although some authors do not see a difference between error causam 
dans and a quality principally and directly intended, the code explicitly 
distinguishes the two, and some Rotal Judges have done the same. 
Stankiewicz and Agustoni have distinguished the figures in theory and in 
fact; others have the difference clear in theory, but sometimes indiscrimi-
nately mingle the concepts in practice. 
The occasion of such a «mixing» gave rise to an interesting distinc-
tion by Bañares. In commenting a decree by Másala dated March 25, 
1986, this author points out that the phrase «he would not have married 
had he known...* as written in the decree is not sufficient to prove an er-
ror of quality directly intended. This formula fits too closely an interpreta-
tive will which is not what canon 1097 deals with, since it expressly ex-
cludes error causam dans 173. 
171 . «Nam huiuscemodi error, etsi det causam contractui, matrimonium irritum non 
reddit (can. 1097, § 2), quia "è solo un errore vizio, e cioè un elemento anormale nella 
formazione psicologica del presupposto intellettivo del consenso che tuttavia non entra 
nell'oggetto della volontà" (FUMAGALLI CARULLI, O . , Intelletto e volontà, cit., p. 257)», c. 
STANKIEWICZ, December 19, 1985, n. 15. 
172. «Iamvero in tali errore, sive ille sit antecedens sive concomitans, consensus fertur 
directe in personam compartis, indirecte autem et secundario in qualitatem, quae ita vertitur 
in motivum contrahendi, si quis dixerit, exempli gratia 'volo ducere Titiam, quam puto esse 
nobilem', etiamsi 'si cognito errore, matrimonium non fuisset contractum' (£. A L P H O N S U S D E 
L I G O R I O , Theol. moralis, cit., nn. 1016, 1012, pp. 31. 28)», c. S T A N K I E W I C Z , December 19, 
1985, n. 15. 
173 . Cfr. J.I. B A N A R E S , Tratamiento del «error qualitatis» en el código actual, in «Ius 
Canonicum» 28 (1988), p. 651. 
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Bafiares acknowledges that some authors do not differentiate between 
an error which is the cause of the contract and that which is principally 
intended. However, in his opinion, following the thought of Giacchi and 
Fumagalli, there is a real difference: the motive for which a person wants 
something is not the same as the object of wanting. As he points out, a 
person may marry because of money or piety towards a sick person, but 
one wants to marry. One thing is the motor of the volitional act, and an-
other thing is what this motor pushes one to wi l l 1 7 4 . 
This distinction (in accordance with current legislation) is well made. 
One may perceive a difference between the motive for acting -what pushes 
one to act- and what is desired in this act of the will. Sometimes the 
cause for acting may also be the specific object of the volitional act, but 
this cause does not necessarily have to be included in the object of 
consent. This is the fundamental difference: a quality which is the 
cause of the contract is the motor for giving consent, but it does not 
become part of the object of consent as in a quality direcdy and principally 
intended. 
Why is it then, that the two errors seem to be often mingled? 1 7 5 . Part 
of the reason may be the relation between an error of a quality principally 
174. «Mostaza, A., ha expuesto su opinion contraria a la instauración de este capítulo 
de nulidad, precisamente por entender que no puede diferenciarse del error causarti dans (Cfr. 
o.c. y otros artículos anteriores citados en ella). 
»En nuestra opinión, su critica a Giacchi y Fumagalli no afecta al fondo de sus argu-
mentos. Con Fumagalli, pensamos que no es lo mismo el motivo por el que alguien quiere 
algo, y el objeto del querer en sí. Se puede querer el matrimonio por dinero, o por piedad con 
un enfermo, etc., y sin embargo querer contraer. Una cosa es el motor inicial del acto de 
querer, y otra aquello a lo que ese motor lleva a querer. (Cfr. FUMAGALLI , O . , Intelletto e 
volontà nel consenso matrimoniale in diritto canonico, Milano 1974, pp. 257-262). Cfr. 
BERNÁRDEZ CANTÓN, A., Compendio de derecho matrimonial canónico, 5' ed., Madrid 1986, 
p. 148». J. I. B A Ñ A R E S , Tratamiento del «error qualitatis» en el código actual, in «Ius 
Canonicum», 28 (1988), p. 651, footnote 4. 
175. As another example, a passage from a sentence is cited which grants the nullity for 
error, but the reasoning includes proofs of error causam dans. «Actis attente coram Domino 
rimatis atque ponderatis, censent infrascripti patres dominam Irmam matrimonium cum 
Roberto contraxisse quia in viro essentiales erronee inveniebat qualitates quibuscum suae 
aspirationes seu intentiones concrete affirmabantur. Cum autem hae determinatae qualitates 
in viro directe et principaliter intendebantur (cf. can. 1097 novi Codicis), verificatur exinde 
error circa qualitates personae in errorem personae redundans», c. H U O T , November 24, 
1987, n. 46, in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1988)4, pp. 462-474. 
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intended and error causam dans; the former is a further restriction of the 
latter. (Vid. Figure). 
Every error in a quality principally and directly 
intended is also error causam dans, but not every 
error causam dans is an error in a quality 
principally and directly intended. 
Another way of expressing this relation is in terms of the characteris-
tics of each error. All of the properties which correspond to error causam 
dans also correspond to an error of a quality directiy intended. However, 
not all of the properties of an error as regards a quality directly intended 
correspond to error causam dans. The former is a much stricter concept. 
This means that whatever is predicated about an error which is the 
cause of the contract can also be predicated about an error of a quality di-
rectly intended. Therefore, statements such as «If I had known, I would 
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not have...» or «He/she would not have contracted had he/she ...» can be 
said about both types of error. The decisions are correct in their logic and 
reasoning when they make these affirmations about the error contemplated 
in canon 1097 § 2, but they have to prove more. They have to prove that 
the motive, the cause for contracting, actually became an essential part of 
the consent. Every error of quality principally and directly intended is er-
ror causam dans, but it is also more. For this reason, not every error 
causam dans is an error of quality directly and principally intended. The 
«1 do» of this latter figure includes the quality as part of its object of voli-
tion, while the «1 do» of the former has its motor of volition in the qual-
ity, but the object is matrimony pure and simple. 
Another reason for the confusion stems from the fact that people 
normally speak in terms of error causam dans. Judges, therefore, will 
normally have to discern an error of quality directly intended from the ac-
tions of the plaintiff or a careful reading of the acts as Agustoni does in 
his case of 1984. (However, even he uses some testimonies which prove 
only error causam dans ). In most causes, it will be a combination of both 
actions and declarations. What the Church asks of her judges is moral 
certainty (Cfr. canon 1608) 1 7 6 . 
One final observation may be offered. It should be obvious that there 
have been and will be many marriages because of a certain event(s) or 
quality(ies). This is common and normal. However very few people enter 
marriage with the idea of contracting with a person who must enjoy a 
certain quality to the point of assuming this quality into the consent. 
Although it is not impossible, it is, in general, unlikely. Therefore, it 
would seem this chapter of nullity will be employed infrequently by ju-
risprudence in granting annulments 1 7 7 . 
176. Concerning moral certainty and evaluation of proofs in matrimonial causes Cfr. C. 
de DlEGO-LORA, Estudios de derecho Procesal Canonico (2. Temas sobre causas matrimo-
niales), Pamplona 1973, pp. 13-19. 
177. With this understanding of the two types of error, which the code explicitly 
distinguishes, one avoids that this canon would become a matrimonial loophole as has 
happened with canon 1095. 
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B. The retroactivity of canon 1097 § 2 
Considering the definition of an error of quality as contemplated in 
canon 1097 § 2 and proposed by this study, the question of retroactivity 
is undisputable. Since this type of error vitiates the consent in its very 
germination, there is no doubt that the supposed matrimony never existed. 
Therefore, the question is not strictly one of retroactivity, but that its nulli-
fying force is based on natural law. 
This is the solution which Judge Huot accepts concerning an error of 
the person. After quoting canon 1097, he cites Reiffenstuel who main-
tains that this error impedes consent by natural l a w 1 7 8 . The judge contin-
ues his reasoning speaking about how a quality principally and directly 
intended can invade and make up part of the object of matrimonial con-
sent. If the object is lacking, then so is consent 1 7 9 . Later in the sentence, 
the ponens returns to the same idea. He claims that, without a doubt, an 
error of quality which redounds in the person is void by natural law 
because it affects the substance of the contract. This time, the Roman 
auditor supports his statement with a quotation from Wernz-Vidal 1 8 0 . 
Finally, the sentence re-asserts the idea that a quality principally intended 
affects the very substance of consent so that, if the quality is lacking so is 
the object of the contract. Therefore, by natural law, the matrimony is 
v o i d 1 8 1 . 
178. Cfr. c. H U O T , November 24, 1987, n. 15, in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1988)4, 
pp. 462-474. 
179 . Using Reiffenstuel's words, the ponens states: «Tunc matrimonium invalidum 
quoque foret ex defectu consensus, utpote qui non ferebatur in personam, nisi praeditam 
qualitate ilia speciali intenta...», c. H U O T , November 24, 1987, n. 15, in «Il Diritto 
Ecclesiastico» (1988)4, pp. 462-474. 
180. «Sine ullo dubio exinde error personae vel qualitatis in errorem personae redun-
dantis ipso jure naturae consensum inficit, nullum proinde reddit matrimonium. Ad rem 
scribit Wernz-Vidal: 'Error de qualitate personae redundans in personam, cum revera sit error 
substantialis de ipsa persona, pariter jure naturae ob defectum consensus dirimit matrimo-
nium'. (WERNZ-VlDAL, JUS canonicum, Tom. V, Jus matrimoniale, Romae, 1928, nn. 467 et 
468)», c. H U O T , November 24, 1987, n. 34, in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1988)4, pp. 
4 6 2 - 4 7 4 . 
1 8 1 . «Qualitates ipsam contractus substantiam ingrediuntur atque constituunt ac 
proinde, deficientibus illis, deficit objectum contractus; deficiente autem objecto, deficit et 
ipse consensus. Ipso jure naturae matrimonium exinde nullum verificato», c. , November 
24, 1987, n. 46, in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1988)4, pp. 462-474. 
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Other Roman judges are not so bold as to base their reasoning in fa-
vor of retroactivity on natural law. They do, though, esteem the figure of 
a quality principally and direcdy intended as a valid solution considering it 
the natural evolution (and resolution) of canon 1083 § 2, 1°. 
For instance, Judge Agustoni's decision of 1984, after having de-
scribed the new canon's wording as «vague», still considers it as the best 
interpretation of the 1917 canon. Therefore, this evolutionary interpreta-
tion is rightly considered, in his opinion, as one which «fits» under canon 
1 0 8 3 1 8 2 . 
Di Felice's decision of 1985 seems to be of the same opinion. After 
quoting the text of canon 1083, the auditor claims that more recent Rotal 
jurisprudence has accepted the Alphonsian interpretation for error redun-
dans 1 8 3 . Di Felice afterwards cites four Rotal sentences which use 
Ligouri's third rule as a legally effective solution to causes accused on the 
grounds of canon 1083 § 2 of the old code 1 8 4 . 
Judge Funghini would also seem to accept the retroactive force of the 
1983 legislation. Although he does not explicitly cite canon 1097, 
Funghini favorably mentions Canals' less strict and wide interpretations 
of error redundans. He seems to consider these interpretations as the natu-
ral evolution of canon 1083, and therefore, applicable to matrimonies cel-
ebrated before the new code came into effect. In addition, based on an ob-
servation at the beginning of his discussion, he would seem willing to 
place the nullifying force in natural law since a quality principally and 
1 8 2 . «Verum tarnen nova lex clarius exprimit tum mentem Legislatoris, cum finem 
legis, ita ut interpretationes quae olim audacem evolutionem sapere dicebantur iam auctori-
tate confirmantur et solido fruuntur fundamento. His innixi Nos quoque tutius in disceptando 
hoc altero capite progressi sumus; licet causa iuxta praeteritam legem sit diiudicanda... 
»Sub luce igitur can. 1 0 9 7 , § 2 , novi Codicis - quem optimum interpretem etiam veteris 
legis considerare oportet eo vel magis quod integram retinuit veteris Codicis primam partem 
paragraphi secundae can. 1 0 8 3 - error matrimonium irritai si vertit circa qualitatem quae prae 
matrimonio intenditur», c. AGUSTONI, July 1 0 , 1 9 8 4 , n. 1 2 and n. 1 4 respectively. 
1 8 3 . «Recentior autem iurisprudentia Nostri Fori ampliorem usum erroris qualitatis in 
errorem personae redundantis susceptit, si qualitas prae persona revera intenditur, 'quia 
directe et principaliter intenditur qualitas et minus principaliter persona' (S. ALPHONSUS DE 
L I G O R I O , Teologia moralis,. 1 8 3 2 , Lib. IV, Tract. VI, cap. II, n. 1 0 1 6 ) » , c. Dl F E L I C E , 
November 1 6 , 1 9 8 5 , n. 1 0 . 
1 8 4 . Here Di Felice lists the following decisions: c. M A N N U C C I , June 2 0 , 1 9 3 2 ; c. 
HEARD, June 2 1 , 1 9 4 1 ; c. HEARD, January 1 4 , 1 9 5 6 , and c. BEJAN, July 1 6 , 1 9 6 9 . 
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directly intended is -in a certain sense- the object of consent. If this quality 
is lacking, then so is consent 1 8 5 . Concerning this aspect, his reasoning is 
much like that of Judge Huot. 
In 1987, Judge Palestro handed down a decision which specifically 
cites only the old legislation. At the same time, though, he accepts the 
consensual interpretation of the third Alphonsian rule as a valid reading of 
canon 1 0 8 3 1 8 6 . This would seem to be an implicit acknowledgement of 
the retroactive force of canon 1097. 
Judge Parisella moves along the same lines. In his decision of June 
16, 1983 (which is after the promulgation of the new code but before it 
came into vigor), the judge only mentions canon 1083. However, he too 
would seem to be in agreement with the Alphonsian interpretation as used 
in the new legislation 1 8 7 . 
In his decision of March 20, 1985, Judge Lanversin, in the in facto 
part of the sentence, claims that the cause should be defined according to 
the old code because one is dealing with a substantial matter and not a 
procedural topic. However, the ponens continues claiming that Alphon-
sus' third rule (considered as a condition) is a correct interpretation. 
Moreover the in iure part of the cause specifically cites canon 1097 § 2 
and says nothing about canon 1 0 8 3 1 8 8 . It seems the new code is being 
used. 
Faltin, Jarawan, Colagiovanni and Stankiewicz simply use the new 
code without giving any explanations or considerations about retroac-
tivity. Thus, they seem to accept the retroactive force of canon 
1097 § 2 1 8 9 . 
1 8 5 . «In prima hypothesi error circa substantiam contractus habetur cum ipsum obie-
ctum eiusque naturam attingat, in altera qualitas, quae primo et principaliter intenditur, veluti 
vices gerit totius obiecti: qualitas ilia scilicet est quodammodo pro toto obiecto ita ut hoc 
reicitur, ilia deficiente», c. FUNGHINI, February 2 4 , 1 9 8 8 , n. 6 , in «Monitor Ecclesiasticus» 
1 1 3 ( 1 9 8 8 ) , pp. 4 5 0 - 4 6 7 . 
1 8 6 . Cfr. c. PALESTRO, June 2 4 , 1 9 8 7 , in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» ( 1 9 8 8 ) 2 , pp. 3 - 1 3 . 
1 8 7 . Cfr. c. PARISELLA, June 1 6 , 1 9 8 3 especially n. 5 7 . 
1 8 8 . Cfr. c. LANVERSIN, March 2 0 , 1 9 8 5 , n. 3 and n. 1 1 . 
1 8 9 . Cfr. c. FALTIN, May 2 6 , 1 9 8 9 ; c. JARAWAN, December 1 8 , 1 9 8 4 ; c. COLAGIOVANNI, 
November 2 2 , 1 9 8 3 ; c. STANKIEWICZ, December 1 9 , 1 9 8 5 ; c. STANKIEWICZ, January 2 4 , 
1 9 8 4 ; and c. STANKIEWICZ, February 2 4 , 1 9 8 3 . It is interesting to note that two of these 
sentences were given even before the new code came into effect. 
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Pompedda's decision of July 22, 1985 maintains, in principle, that 
the cause should be judged by the old c o d e 1 9 0 . However, the entire in 
iure part of the cause deals with the possible interpretations of canon 1097 
(concerning which Judge Pompedda feels that there should be some fur-
ther refinements). From the in facto part of the cause, it would seem he is 
in favor of using the interpretation as given by canon 1097 considering it 
the natural evolution of canon 1083. 
The only auditor who openly denies the retroactive force of 1097 § 2 
is Judge Másala. In a decree dated March 25, 1986, he claims that since 
the matrimony took place before November 27, 1983 (the date which the 
new code came into effect), the cause should be judged according to the 
1917 c o d e 1 9 1 . Despite this statement, Másala does consider the cause 
under the new canon as well as the old. As Bañares points out in his arti-
cle, perhaps Másala feared that his denial of retroactivity would be dis-
puted. The Roman judge concedes that «even if one were to consider 
1097 § 2 retroactive...*. He then goes on to deny the nullity under this 
chapter as we l l 1 9 2 . 
In general, it would seem that the majority of Roman judges accept 
the retroactive force of canon 1097 § 2, be it explicitly or implicitly. Some 
simply use the new code without any explanations. Huot bases the nulli-
fying force of 1097 § 2 on natural law given that a quality principally in-
tended becomes a part of matrimonial consent. If the quality does not ex-
ist, then neither does consent. Other auditors would seem to implicitly ac-
cept the retroactive force of canon 1097 § 2 given that -in their opinion-
it is the natural evolution and best interpretation of the old canon 1083 1 9 3 . 
190. «Patet insuper ex üsdem dictis praesentem causam iudicandam et definiendam esse 
iuxta can. 1083, § 2, I o codicis abrogati idest anni 1917», c. POMPEDDA, July 22, 1985, n. 
16. 
191 . «Cum matrimonium in causa celebratum sit ante diem 27 novembris a. 1983, quo 
nova legislatio vim habere cepit, casus decernendus est iuxta can. 1083 veteris legis, ad 
quam provocavit et ipse actor in suo libello». Decree c. M Á S A L A , March 25, 1986, n. 4 in 
«Ius Canonicum» 28 (1988), pp. 637-639. 
192. «Quod si admitteretur can. 1097, § 2 Codicis juris canonici, recenter editi, habere 
valorem retroactivum (quod infrascripti Auditores non admittunt), . . .». Decree c. M A S ALA, 
March 25, 1986, n. 4, in «Ius Canonicum» 28 (1988), pp. 637-639. 
193 . C. Gullo seems follows this reasoning as well. Cfr. C. G U L L O , Note minime su 
retroattività e rapporto fra par I e II del can. 1097 C.J.C., in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» 
(1986)2, pp. 356-366. However, the present work would not agree with the idea, as the 
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Only one judge openly denied retroactivity, but it is significant that he did 
continue to expressly judge the cause under the new canon as well as the 
old one. Following is a table which summarizes the different stances of 
the decisions studied given after 1982. 
Uses can. 
1097 
Accepts 
Evolry. intrp. 
Rejects 
Retro. 
STANKTEWICZ Feb. 24, 1983 
PARISELLA Jun. 16, 1983 
COLAGIOVANNI Nov. 22, 1983 V 
STANKTEWICZ Jan. 24, 1984 
AGUSTONI Jul. 10, 1984 
JARAWAN Dec. 18, 1984 
DELANVERSIN Mar. 20, 1985 (V) 
POMPEDDA Jul. 22, 1985 (V) 
DI FELICE Nov. 16, 1985 V 
STANKTEWICZ Dec. 19, 1985 
MAS ALA Mar. 25, 1986 
PALESTRO Jun. 24, 1987 
HUOT Nov. 24, 1987 
FUNGHINI Feb. 24, 1988 V 
FALTIN May 26, 1989 V 
(V) indicates that in principle the old code is used but the judge seems to accept 
St. Alphonsus' interpretation. 
author maintains on p. 357, that new formulation of canon 1097 § 2 is only a formal 
difference and not a substantial change. 
With the author's acceptance of the evolutionary interpretation, he would seem to have 
modified his stance as presented in his article of 1981. Cfr. C. G U L L O , Error qualitatis 
redundans in errorem personae, in «Il Diritto Ecclesiastico» (1981)1, p. 359. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
1. Judge Canals' famous decision of 1970 marked a new era in the 
interpretation of error redundans. Not only did his interpretation 
(insightful but also widely disputed) of this juridical figure have a 
profound effect on subsequent jurisprudence, but it also paved the way in 
helping to understand the exact components and to have a clearer concept 
of this chapter of nullity. 
2. Eventually, the appreciation of error redundans was considered by 
some Rotal judges to consist in a double aspect or a combination of two 
currents: Canals and St. Alphonsus. The quality should be objectively 
important, and the same quality must be principally and directly intended 
by the contractant. 
3. However, a study of Rotal sentences would seem to indicate that 
the objective interpretation, although correct in theory, resisted a coherent 
interpretation in concrete causes. 
4. At the same time, Rotal judges, following the teachings of Vatican 
II, began placing more emphasis on the content of this matrimonial 
consent; the mere ius in corpus began giving way to the consortium totius 
vitae. Therefore, the subjective estimation of the quality, especially when 
looked at from the point of view of consent, was seen to have a greater 
effect on the matrimonial bond. 
5. A clear shift in focus began to develop: away from the quality and 
towards the consent or will of the contracting party. As a result, the 
objective aspect of the quality becomes relatively important while the 
subjective aspect has an absolute importance. 
6. The logic of this juridical figure revolves around the fact that the 
quality desired invades the very substance of the contract. In other words, 
the quality becomes part of the object of consent; if the object of the 
matrimonial consent is lacking then the consent itself is deficient, and 
therefore, no matrimonial bond is generated. This opinion is perfectly 
harmonious with the consensual system of matrimony as recently 
emphasized by the Council. 
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7. Proving a quality was principally and directly intended usually 
rests more heavily on the actions of the plaintiff than on his/her testimony. 
8. Concerning the actions of the plaintiff, there are two fundamental 
moments which must be taken into account: 1) the predetermination of the 
contractant's will before the matrimony concerning the qual i ty 1 9 4 , and 2) 
the reaction and behavior of the contractant upon discovering the error. 
9. The objective importance of the quality -according to the customs 
or traditions of the society- serves as a very useful indicator that a 
particular quality may be directly and principally intended; thus, it can be 
one element in proving the marital consent essentially includes this 
quality. However, that this quality was, in fact, directly intended by a 
specific person must be proved in each particular case. 
10. Error causam dans and an error of quality directly and principally 
intended can be distinguished in theory and in fact; they are clearly 
differentiated in the code. 
11. Error causam dans is the motive for acting; it is what pushes one 
to emit the volitional act. An error of quality principally and directly 
intended is not only the cause of willing, but moreover, it becomes part of 
the object of consent. 
12. Error of a quality principally and directly intended seems to be a 
subset of an error which is the cause of the contract. Everything that can 
be predicated about error causam dans is also true of an error of quality as 
contemplated in canon 1097 § 2. However, to appreciate an error of 
quality principally intended, one must go further and prove a much greater 
identity between the cause and the consent: this latter must contain the 
former. 
194. The will's antecedent and predetermínate binding to the quality is described thus by 
one author: «La objetividad debe darse por tanto no en mostrar un error en cualidad grave, 
sino en mostrar que realmente existió en el sujeto la determinación previa y absoluta de su 
voluntad, vinculándose al hecho en cuestión. Es, por tanto, esta vinculación la que debe ser 
objetiva para el juez, y la que debe demostrarse en un proceso de nulidad». J.I. B A Ñ A R E S , El 
error y la ignorancia en el consentimiento matrimonial. Pamplona 1988, («pro manu-
scripto»). 
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13. For the reason given above, and because people tend to speak 
more about the things which induced them to marry, sometimes these two 
concepts are not always clearly distinguished. 
14. The retroactivity of 1097 § 2 is accepted by the majority of 
sentences which have discussed this issue be it by explicitly using canon 
1097 or be it implicitly by recognizing the substance of the canon (St. 
Alphonsus' third rule) as a valid interpretaion of canon 1083 of the 1917 
code. 
15. Considering the inherent linkage between quality and consent, it 
appears that the retroactive force should be based on natural law. In other 
words, when the quality which is directly and principally intended is 
lacking there is no matrimonial consent; it simply does not exist. The 
reason stems from the fact that this quality becomes an essential part of 
the object of the volitional act. Therefore, if this object is lacking, the 
volitional act (the consent) is void in its root. 
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